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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Keynesian Models
of Closed and Open Economies
by
Konstantin Platonov
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Roger E. Farmer, Chair
My dissertation contributes to the macroeconomics of self-fulfilling prophecies.
It demonstrates the importance of shocks to beliefs in accounting for aggregate
fluctuations. The dissertation consists of three chapters.
The first chapter is a paper joint with Roger E.A. Farmer. We integrate
Keynesian economics with general equilibrium theory in a new way. We develop
a simple graphical apparatus, the IS-LM-NAC framework, that can be used by
policy makers to understand how policy affects the economy. A new element, the
No-Arbitrage-Condition (NAC) curve, connects the interest rate to current and
expected future values of the stock market and it explains how ‘animal spirits’
influence economic activity. Our framework provides a rich new approach to
policy analysis that explains the short-run and long-run effects of policy.
The second chapter studies implications of self-fulfilling beliefs in open economies.
Uncovered interest parity states that the carry trade should deliver zero profit, on
average. The data robustly reject this hypothesis. In a large sample of countries,
high interest rate currencies earn excess returns at short horizons and negative
excess returns at longer horizons. I rationalize this observation in a two-country
overlapping generations model with complete markets that features multiple dy-
ii
namic equilibria. Because newborns cannot make decisions about consumption
and savings before they are born, there is a set of self-fulfilling beliefs of the
currently alive generations about the decisions of the future newborns. I utilize
the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria by imposing a structure on the formation
of beliefs. Beliefs are self-fulfilling, and shocks to these beliefs generate a large
and volatile risk premium that is correlated with the interest rate differential.
Changes in uncertainty about beliefs cause a reversal of expected excess returns
associated with the current interest differential, similar to the reversal found in
the data. I provide empirical evidence in favor of my mechanism and show that
persistence of past expectations can account for most of the observed deviation
from uncovered interest parity.
The third chapter extends the methodology developed in the first chapter to
the open economy framework. I build a model of the eurozone crisis. I study a
two-country model in which agents form self-fulfilling beliefs about asset prices.
Using the labor market search and matching frictions and abandoning Nash bar-
gaining over wage, I create multiple equilibria on the labor market where any
unemployment rate can be sustained as a steady state. Self-fulfilling beliefs about
the future value of assets select the equilibrium. I show that sudden downward
revisions of beliefs (‘animal spirits’) cause stagnation in real economic activity,
international financial contagion, and, in the absence of recovery in confidence,
permanently high rates of unemployment. High unemployment is viewed as a new
steady state, not a temporary deviation from the natural rate of unemployment.
Policy aimed at recovering the eurozone needs to trigger optimistic beliefs about
the value of assets.
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CHAPTER 1
Animal Spirits in a Monetary Model
This paper was jointly written with Roger E.A. Farmer and published as ”Ani-
mal Spirits in a Monetary Economy,” Roger E.A. Farmer, Konstantin Platonov,
European Economic Review, 115, 2019, pages 60-77
1.1 Introduction
In the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, a consensus developed among aca-
demic macroeconomists that the problem of macroeconomic stability had been
solved. According to that consensus, the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model provides a good first approximation to the way
that monetary policy influences output, inflation and unemployment. In its sim-
plest form, the New Keynesian model has three equations; a dynamic IS curve,
a policy equation that describes how the central bank sets the interest rate, and
a New-Keynesian Phillips curve. In its more elaborate form, the New-Keynesian
DSGE model is reflected in work that builds on the medium scale DSGE model
of Frank Smets and Raf Wouters (2007).
The New Keynesian model evolved from post-war economic theory in which
the Keynesian economics of the General Theory , (Keynes, 1936), was grafted
onto the microeconomics of Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Walras, 1899).
Paul Samuelson, in the third edition of his undergraduate textbook, (Samuelson,
1955), referred to this hybrid theory as the ‘neoclassical synthesis’. According to
1
the neoclassical synthesis, the economy is Keynesian in the short-run, when not
all wages and prices have adjusted to clear markets; it is classical in the long-run,
when all wages and prices have adjusted to clear markets and the demands and
supplies for all goods and for labor are equal.1
The neoclassical synthesis is still the main framework taught in economics text-
books, and, in the form of ‘dynamic IS-LM analysis’, it is used by policy makers
to frame the way they think about the influence of changes in fiscal and mone-
tary policy on economic activity.2 This paper proposes an alternative framework.
Building on work by Roger Farmer (2010a) we integrate Keynesian economics
with general equilibrium theory in a new way to demonstrate that low-income
high-unemployment inefficient equilibria may be sustained in the long run. Our
work displays two main differences from the New Keynesian model.
First, the steady state equilibria of our model display dynamic indeterminacy.
For every steady state equilibrium, there are multiple dynamic paths, all of which
converge to the same steady state. We use that property to explain how changes
in the money supply may be associated with immediate changes in real economic
activity without invoking artificial barriers to price change. Prices in our model
are set one period in advance, but there are no explicit costs of price adjustment.3
Second, our model displays steady state indeterminacy. We adopt a labor
search model in which the presence of externalities generates multiple steady state
equilibria. Unlike classical search models we do not close the model by assuming
that firms and workers bargain over the wage.4 Instead, as in Farmer (2010a;
1This characterization of the history of thought is drawn from Farmer (2010b) and elaborated
on in Farmer (2016a).
2See, for example, Mankiw (2014).
3For earlier papers that invoke that idea see Farmer and Woodford (1997), Farmer (1991,
1999, 2000, 2002), Matheny (1998), and Benhabib and Farmer (2000). Although we do not
explicitly adopt the assumptions of menu costs (Mankiw, 1985) or price rigidity (Christiano
et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007), these are both possible explanations for agents in our
model to select an equilibrium in which prices are predetermined.
4By classical search models, we mean the literature that builds on work by Peter Diamond,
(1982), Dale Mortensen, (1970), and Chris Pissarides (1976).
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2012b; 2016a), firms and workers take wages and prices as given and employment
is determined by aggregate demand. We use that feature to explain why unem-
ployment is highly persistent in the data. Persistent unemployment, in our model,
represents potentially permanent deviations of the market equilibrium from the
social optimum.5
To close our model, we assume that equilibrium is selected by ‘animal spirits’
and we model that idea with a belief function as in Farmer (1999, 2002, 2012a). We
treat the belief function as a fundamental with the same methodological status as
preferences and endowments and we study the implications of that assumption for
the ability of monetary policy to influence inflation, output and unemployment.
Although we use a stylized calibration of our model to generate impulse response
graphs, this paper is not a serious piece of data analysis: Our contribution is to
introduce a new pedagogical tool, the IS-LM-NAC model, and to illustrate the use
of that tool with a series of policy exercises. We refer the reader to Farmer and
Nicolo` (2018), Keynesian economics without the Phillips curve, for an empirical
application of our framework.
There have been many attempts to build micro-foundations to the IS-LM
model. The most popular is the dominant New-Keynesian model that appears in
modern graduate textbooks (Gal´ı, 2008; Woodford, 2003). Bilbiie (2008, 2019)
and Dong et al. (2016) use credit market imperfections to generate Keynesian
results from micro foundations and a micro-founded approach that stresses finan-
5 King et al. (1991); Beyer and Farmer (2007b) and Farmer (2012c, 2015) find evidence of
a unit root in the U.S. unemployment rate. Sticky-price models with a unique determinate
steady-state equilibrium have difficulty generating enough persistence to understand this fact,
as do unique-equilibrium models of the monetary transmission mechanism that assume sticky
information (Mankiw and Reis, 2007) or rational inattention, (Sims, 2003). Our approach
generates permanent equilibrium movements in the unemployment rate that are consistent with
a unit root, or near unit root, in U.S. unemployment data and is complimentary to theories that
explicitly model small costs of price change. Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers (1986;
1987) attribute persistent unemployment to models that display hysteresis. Our model has that
feature, but for different reasons than the explanation given by Blanchard and Summers. For a
recent survey that explains the evolution of models of dynamic and steady state indeterminacy,
see Farmer (2016b).
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cial market imperfections has found its way into the undergraduate curriculum
in the UK with the influential textbook by Carlin and Soskice (2014). Our main
difference from these approaches is the ability of our model to generate deviations
of the unemployment rate from the social optimum that can persist forever in the
absence of monetary or fiscal policy intervention.
The supply side of our model was developed in Farmer (2012b, 2013) and in
Farmer (2016a) where Farmer refers to a model closed by beliefs, as a “Keyne-
sian search model” to distinguish it from the classical approach to search theory
(Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 1970; Pissarides, 1984). Keynesian search theory
replaces the classical assumption that the bargaining weight is a parameter with
the alternative assumption that the unemployment rate is demand determined.
The current paper builds on the Keynesian search approach by including the
real value of money balances in the utility function to capture the function of
money as a means of exchange. The addition of money leads to genuinely new
results from the real model in Farmer’s previous work. For example, we show that,
under some specifications of beliefs, money may be non-neutral. An unanticipated
shock to the money supply may have a permanent effect on the unemployment
rate through its influence on beliefs about the real value of future wealth.
1.2 The Model
We construct a two-period overlapping generations model. In every period there
are two generations of representative households; the young and the old.6 The
young inelastically supply one unit of labor, but, due to search frictions, a fraction
of young individuals remain unemployed in any given period. We assume that
there is perfect insurance within the household and that labor income is split
6The restriction to two-period lives is made for expository purposes only. In section 1.12 we
develop a long-lived version of our approach using the Blanchard (1985) perpetual youth model.
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between current consumption, interest bearing assets, and money balances.
Households hold money, physical capital and financial assets in the form of
government bonds. Money is dominated in rate-of-return and is held for transac-
tion purposes. We model this by assuming that real money balances yield utility
as in Patinkin (1956). The old generation receives interest on capital and bonds
and they sell assets to the young generation. We close the markets for physical
capital and labor by assuming that there is one unit of non-reproducible capital
and that the labor-force participation rate is constant and equal to one. We also
assume that government bonds are in zero net supply.
There is a single good produced by a continuum of competitive firms. Firms
rent capital from old generation individuals and hire young generation individuals.
Hiring labor is subject to search frictions. Firms take prices and wages as given
and they allocate a fraction of labor to recruiting. We assume that every worker
allocated to recruiting can hire q new workers, where q is taken as given by firms
but determined in equilibrium by the search technology. Every worker allocated
to recruiting is one less worker allocated to production.
Search in the labor market generates multiple equilibria. To select equilibrium,
we assume that economic agents form beliefs about the real value of their financial
wealth using a belief function that is a primitive of our model. Our Keynesian
search approach differs from the more usual assumption in the classical labor
search literature where the equilibrium is pinned down by Nash bargaining over
the real wage.7
To make our model transparent, we consider only permanent unanticipated
shocks to beliefs. There is no uncertainty regarding other fundamentals of the
economy.
7Farmer (2016a, Chapter 7) distinguishes Keynesian search models, where employment is
determined by aggregate demand, from classical search models, where employment is determined
by Nash bargaining.
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Our model provides a microfoundation for the textbook Keynesian cross, in
which the equilibrium level of output is determined by aggregate demand. Our
labor market structure explains why firms are willing to produce any quantity
of goods demanded, and our assumption that beliefs are fundamental determines
aggregate demand. In our model, beliefs select an equilibrium and in that equi-
librium, the unemployment rate may differ permanently from the social planning
optimum.
1.3 Aggregate Supply
There is a unit continuum of competitive firms. We represent the capital and
labor employed and output produced by each individual firm with the symbols
Kt, Lt, and Yt.
8 To refer to aggregate labor and aggregate output we use the
symbols L¯t and Y¯t. The variables Kt, Lt, and Yt are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] where
K¯t =
∫
j
Kt(j)dj, L¯t =
∫
j
Lt(j)dj, Y¯t =
∫
j
Yt(j)dj.
Since all firms face the same prices and will make the same decisions, it will always
be true that Kt(j) = Kt, Lt(j) = Lt and Yt(j) = Yt, hence, we will dispense with
the subscript j in the remainder of our exposition.
All workers work only in the first period of their life. A firm puts forward a
production plan in which it proposes to allocate Xt workers to production and Vt
workers to recruiting where
Lt = Xt + Vt.
Output is given by the expression
Yt = K
α
t X
1−α
t ,
8The model developed in this section is drawn from Farmer (2012b).
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and the total number of workers employed at the firm is equal to
Lt = qtVt, (1.1)
where the firm takes qt as given. Putting these pieces together, we may express
the output of the firm as
Yt = K
α
t
[(
1− 1
qt
)
Lt
]1−α
. (1.2)
Firms maximize profit,
PtYt −RtKt −WtLt,
by choosing how much capital and labor to hire. Here Pt is the money price of
goods, Rt is the money rental rate of capital and Wt is the money wage. Perfect
competition implies that factors earn their marginal products and profit is equal
to zero.
(1− α)Yt
Lt
=
Wt
Pt
and (1.3)
Notice that equation (1.2) looks like a classical production function with one
exception. The variable, qt, which represents labor market tightness, influences
total factor productivity. One may show that qt is greater than 1 in equilibrium.
A low value of qt corresponds to a tight labor market in which firms must devote
a large amount of resources to recruiting and in which productivity is low. A high
value of qt corresponds to a loose labor market in which firms may devote a small
amount of resources to recruiting and in which productivity is high.
At the aggregate level, we assume the existence of a matching technology that
determines aggregate employment L¯t as a function of aggregate resources devoted
to recruiting, V¯t, and the aggregate number of unemployed searching workers, U¯t.
This function is given by,
7
L¯t = m
(
V¯t, U¯t
) ≡ (ΓV¯t)1/2 , (1.4)
where U¯t = 1 because workers are fired every period and the number of searching
workers is equal to 1 at the beginning of every period.9 Because the economy
is endowed with one unit of labor, the end-of-period unemployment rate can be
defined as
Ut = 1− L¯t.
The parameter Γ in the matching function determines the efficiency of the
matching technology. In a symmetric equilibrium where Lt = L¯t, we may combine
equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.4) to find an expression for Yt in terms of Lt and L¯t
Yt = K
α
t
[
Lt
(
1− L¯t
Γ
)]1−α
, (1.5)
where L¯t/Γ = 1/qt.
Equation (1.5) is the private production function. This function represents
the connection between the output of an individual firm, Yt, the capital and labor
inputs at the level of the firm, Kt and Lt, and the labor input of all other firms, L¯t.
The private production function is distinct from the social production function,
equation (1.6),
Y¯t = K¯
α
t
[
L¯t
(
1− L¯t
Γ
)]1−α
, (1.6)
which represents the connection between aggregate output Y¯t and aggregate cap-
ital and labor inputs, K¯t and L¯t. We illustrate the properties of the social pro-
9This simplification requires the assumption that workers can, in effect, recruit themselves.
Farmer (2012b) discusses the assumption further and Farmer (2013) drops the assumption and
treats employment as an additional state variable. In the complete dynamic model, the fraction
of workers assigned to recruiting is a small fraction of the workforce, as opposed to the current
formulation where, at the social optimum, 50% of the firm’s workers are engaged in recruiting.
Because nothing of substance is added to the model by studying the full dynamics of the labor
market we have chosen, in this paper, to use the simpler model, where labor is not a state
variable, for expositional purposes.
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Figure 1.1: The Social Production Function
duction function on Figure 1.1. On this figure, we see that output is increasing in
employment up to a maximum that occurs at Γ/2.
The social production function exhibits search externalities. For large val-
ues of aggregate employment, L¯t, the labor market becomes very tight and fur-
ther reduction of unemployment is costly. As firms allocate more workers to
the recruiting activity, those workers are withdrawn from production. If employ-
ment increases beyond Γ/2, additional increases in aggregate employment become
counter-productive.10 The value of unemployment at the social optimum,
U = 1− Γ
2
, (1.7)
is our definition of the natural rate of unemployment.11
10In the special case when Γ = 1, output is maximized when L¯ = 1/2 and, when L¯ = 1,
aggregate output falls to zero.
11Friedman (1968) defined the natural rate of unemployment to be the equilibrium rate. That
definition only makes sense when equilibrium is unique. In our model, there is a continuum of
steady state equilibria and in this framework it makes more sense to define the natural rate of
unemployment to be the unemployment rate at the social planning optimum.
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1.4 Aggregate Demand
There is a continuum of households. Each household lives for two periods and
derives utility from consumption when young Cyt , consumption when old C
o
t+1,
and real money balances accumulated in the first period of their life Mt+1/Pt.
Labor does not deliver disutility, and therefore the participation rate is always
equal to 1.12
Preferences are given by a logarithmic utility function. Households maximize
expected utility,
ut = log (C
y
t ) + βEt
[
log
(
Cot+1
)]
+ δ log
(
Mt+1
Pt
)
(1.8)
where the mathematical expectation is taken with respect to the future realization
of the stock market. We describe determination of the value of the stock market
in the next section.
In the first period of their life, households earn labor income WtLt. They use
their income to purchase current consumption PtC
y
t , capital goods PK,tKt+1 and
government bonds Bt+1. All prices are in terms of money.
In the second period of life, households rent capital to firms and earn the
rental payment Rt+1Kt+1 and interest accrued on their loan to the government
(1 + it)Bt+1. In addition, at the end of the period they sell capital and money
to the new young generation. The first and second period budget constraints are
given by the following equations:
PtC
y
t +Mt+1 +Bt+1 + PK,tKt+1 = WtLt, (1.9)
12Allowing for disutility from participation in the labor market would make the participation
rate endogenous. We do not pursue that modification here because, in the U.S. data, the
participation rate appears to be driven mostly by demography and does not exhibit a pronounced
co-movement with unemployment at business cycle frequencies.
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Pt+1C
o
t+1 = (Rt+1 + PK,t+1)Kt+1 + (1 + it)Bt+1 +Mt+1. (1.10)
The no-arbitrage condition (NAC) implies that the return to government bonds
must be equal to the return on physical capital, when evaluated in terms of utility
from consumption in the second period,
Et
[
β
Cot+1
(
1 + it
Pt+1/Pt
− (PK,t+1 +Rt+1) /Pt+1
PK,t/Pt
)]
= 0. (1.11)
Here the first term in round parentheses is the expected real interest rate payed on
government bonds. The second term in the round parentheses is the real return
to physical capital. In words, this equation states that the young are indifferent
between investing in bonds and capital. Using this condition, and defining real
savings of the young in interest-bearing non-monetary assets as follows,
Syt = (Bt+1 + PK,tKt+1)/Pt, (1.12)
we can write the young’s consumption function Cyt , the demand for real money
balances Mt+1/Pt and the young’s real savings function S
y
t that solve the utility
maximization problem:
Cyt =
1
1 + β + δ
WtLt
Pt
, (1.13)
Mt+1
Pt
=
δ
1 + β + δ
(
1 + it
it
)
WtLt
Pt
. (1.14)
Syt =
WtLt
Pt
− Cyt −
Mt+1
Pt
. (1.15)
Substituting for consumption and money balances in (1.15) gives the following
alternative expression for saving
Syt =
1
1 + β + δ
(
β − δ
it
)
WtLt
Pt
. (1.16)
The saving of the young is an increasing function of the money interest rate
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because money and consumption are substitutes in utility and the money interest
rate is the opportunity cost of holding money. In the traditional IS-LM model,
saving is sometimes written as an increasing function of the real interest rate.
That channel for the interest rate to influence saving is missing from our model
because of our simplifying assumptions that utility is logarithmic and that labor
supply occurs only in youth.13
To simplify the exposition of our model, we assume that government bonds
are in zero net supply and we concentrate on the role of monetary policy. We
study a policy in which the central bank keeps the money supply M∗t constant,
and where that policy is expected to continue forever. In that environment we
study the effect of an unanticipated change in M∗t that we implement through an
unanticipated cash transfer to the old generation. In future work we plan to study
the role of fiscal interventions.
1.5 The Role of Beliefs
Although our work is superficially similar to the IS-LM model and its modern New
Keynesian variants; there are significant differences. By grounding the aggregate
supply function in the theory of search and, more importantly, by dropping the
Nash bargaining assumption, we arrive at a theory where preferences, technology
and endowments are not sufficient to uniquely select an equilibrium.
Following Farmer (2012b) we close our model by making beliefs fundamental.
Farmer studies that assumption in the context of a purely real representative
agent model. In the current paper we explore the implications of multiple steady
13Relaxing the unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution by considering a utility function
of the form U (Cy, Co,M/P ) = log (Cy) + β log
(
Co + C¯
)
+ δ log (M/P ) would add the real
interest rate as an argument of the savings function. When C¯ > 0, the intertemporal substitution
effect dominates the income effect, making the savings function increasing in both money interest
rate as the price of money and the real interest rate as the relative price of consumption when
old. In this model, we adopt C¯ = 0 for expository purposes.
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state equilibria in a model where money is used as a means of exchange and
where the representative agent assumption is replaced by a model of overlapping
generations.14
The assumption that beliefs are fundamental is not sufficient to explain how
they are fundamental and the belief function could take different forms. In our
view, beliefs are most likely learned and we see the work of George Evans and
Seppo Honkapohja (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) as a promising avenue in de-
scribing how a particular belief function may arise. In this respect beliefs are
similar to preferences.15
Economists assume that a human being is described by a preference ordering
and that by the time a person achieves adulthood he or she is able to make choices
over any given commodity bundle. But those choices are learned during childhood;
they are not inherited. At the age of twenty one, an Italian is likely to choose a
glass of wine with a meal; a German is more likely to choose a beer. But a German
child, adopted into an Italian family at birth, will grow up with the preferences of
his adoptive parents, not with those of his biological parents. Beliefs, in our view,
are similar.
During a period of stable economic activity, people learn to make forecasts
about future variables by projecting observations of variables of interest on their
information from the recent past. When there is a change in the environment,
caused by a policy shift or a large shock to fundamentals, they continue to use the
beliefs that they learned from the past. That argument suggests that we should
treat the parameters of the belief function in the same way that we treat the pa-
rameters of the utility function. They are objects that we would expect to remain
stable over the medium term and that should be estimated using econometric
14 Plotnikov (2013, 2019) explores a similar idea in a version of a real business cycle model,
closed with Farmer’s (2012b) Keynesian search model of the labor market. Plotnikov closes his
model with the assumption that beliefs about future human wealth are adaptive and he shows
that a model, closed in this way, generates jobless recoveries.
15The discussion in this section closely follows the presentation in Farmer (2016a).
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methods.
In this paper we investigate one plausible assumption about the belief function
and we study its role as a way of closing our model. We assume that beliefs are
determined by the equation
E∗t
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= Θt, (1.17)
where the expectations operator in equation (1.17) is subjective and reflects the
beliefs of a representative person of the probabilities of future events. To impose
discipline on our analysis we assume that expectations are rational; that is,
E∗t
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= Et
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= Θt, (1.18)
where the expectation E is taken with respect to the true probabilities in a rational
expectations equilibrium.
Because there is no aggregate investment in our model, capital represents an
input in fixed supply. We interpret PK to be the the average price of assets traded
in the stock market and changes in PK represent self-fulfilling shifts in perceptions
of financial wealth.
1.6 The Equations of the Model
The equilibrium of our model is described by the following seven equations. To
obtain these equations, we used two facts. First, factor incomes are proportional
to GDP,
RtKt
Pt
= αYt and
WtLt
Pt
= (1− α)Yt (1.19)
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and second, in a symmetric equilibrium, total employment equals individual em-
ployment and each firm employs one unit of capital,
Lt = L¯t and Kt = 1. (1.20)
Now we turn to a description of each of the seven equations that comprise our
model.
1− α
1 + β + δ
(
β − δ
it
)
Yt =
PK,t
Pt
. (1.21)
Equation (1.21) describes equilibrium in the asset markets. It equates the demand
for interest bearing assets by the young (the young’s real savings function Syt ) to
the real value of the single unit of capital (PK,t/Pt) available in the economy. Since
government bonds are in zero supply, the young’s savings must be equal to the
purchases of capital sold by the old generation. Equation (1.21) is our analog of
the IS curve.
M∗t+1
Pt
=
(1− α)δ
1 + β + δ
(
1 + it
it
)
Yt. (1.22)
Equation (1.22) is the money market clearing condition and it is our equivalent
of the LM curve. Here M∗t+1 is the stock of money exogenously determined by
the central bank and available for the young generation to hold as part of their
optimal portfolio.
Et
[
β
Cot+1
(
1 + it
Pt+1/Pt
− (PK,t+1 + αPt+1Yt+1) /Pt+1
PK,t/Pt
)]
= 0. (1.23)
Equation (1.23) is the no-arbitrage condition (NAC) between the money interest
rate and the return to capital. This equation represents the assumption that
physical capital and government bonds pay the same rate of return and it has no
analog in the simplest version of the IS-LM model.
PtC
o
t = αPtYt + PK,t +M
∗
t . (1.24)
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Equation (1.24) is the expenditure function of the old. It says that the old’s
expenditure on consumption must be equal to the income plus principal from
selling capital plus the value of the money held by the old.
Yt =
[(
1− Lt
Γ
)
Lt
]1−α
. (1.25)
Equation (1.25) is the social production function. This equation serves only to
determine employment and it plays the role of the 45 degree line in the Keynesian
Cross model.
Next, real GDP is the sum of the consumption of the two generations
Yt = C
y
t + C
o
t . (1.26)
Finally, we add a seventh equation, the belief function (1.27).
Et
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= Θt. (1.27)
The belief function distinguishes our model from the New Keynesian approach
and it replaces the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In the absence of this new
element, the other six equations would not uniquely determine the seven endoge-
nous variables {Yt, Pt, it, PK,t, Lt, Cyt , Cot }. The belief function is an equation that
determines how much households are willing to pay for claims on the economy’s
capital stock. It represents the aggregate state of confidence or ‘animal spirits’
and, in combination with the other six equations of the model, the belief function
selects an equilibrium.
In our comparative statics exercises in Section 1.8, we compare two alternative
specifications for the belief function. In one specification we assume that,
Θt = Θ for all t. (1.28)
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We call this assumption fixed beliefs and it amounts to the assumption that, in
the collective view of asset market participants, the stock market has some fixed
real value measured in terms of the CPI.
In a second specification we assume that
Θt =
PK,t
Pt
. (1.29)
We call this assumption adaptive beliefs and it amounts to the assumption that, in
the collective view of market participants, the real value of the stock market is a
random walk. This second assumption, which is a better description of the actual
behavior of stock market prices, has a non-standard implication that we draw
attention to in Section 1.10.3. It implies that unanticipated shocks to the money
supply can have permanent effects on the steady state unemployment rate.16
Equations (1.21), (1.22), (1.23), (1.24), (1.26), and (1.27) determine aggregate
demand. Given beliefs {Θt} and monetary policy M∗t , these equations select an
equilibrium sequence for {Yt, Pt, it, PK,t, Cyt , Cot } and equation (1.25) determines
how much labor firms need to hire to satisfy aggregate demand. Since employment
is determined recursively, in the subsequent parts of the paper we dispense with
equation (1.25) in our discussion of equilibrium.
1.7 The IS-LM-NAC Representation of the Steady-State
In this section, we show that the steady-state equilibrium of our model admits a
representation that is similar to the IS-LM representation of the General Theory
developed by Hicks and Hansen. The IS-LM model is a static construct in which
the price level is predetermined. To provide a fully dynamic model, Samuelson
16 Farmer (2012c, 2015) finds evidence that the real value of the stock market and the unem-
ployment rate can be parsimoniously modeled as co-integrated random walks. Our work in this
paper provides one possible theoretical model that can explain this finding.
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closed the IS-LM model by adding a price adjustment equation that later New-
Keynesian economists replaced with the New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
We take a different approach. We select an equilibrium by closing the labor
market with a belief function. Our model consists of the IS curve, the LM curve
and the NAC curve. The NAC curve is a new element that equates the return to
capital to the nominal interest rate. And unlike the interpretation of animal spirits
that was popularized by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009), pessimistic
animal spirits are fully rational. The people in our model are rational and have
rational expectations but they are, sometimes, unable to coordinate on a socially
efficient outcome.
The following equations characterize the steady-state equilibrium:
IS:
1− α
1 + β + δ
(
β − δ
i
)
Y = Θ, (1.30)
LM:
M
P
=
(1− α)δ
1 + β + δ
(
1 + i
i
)
Y, (1.31)
NAC: i =
αY
Θ
. (1.32)
Equations (1.30) – (1.32) determine the three unknowns: Y , i and P , for given val-
ues of M and Θ. We treat Θ = E[PK/P ] as a new exogenous variable that reflects
investor confidence about the real value of their financial assets and by making
Θ exogenous we provide a new interpretation of Keynes’ idea that equilibrium is
selected by ‘animal spirits’.
In (Y, i) space, the IS and NAC curves determine Y and i and the price level
adjusts to ensure that the LM curve intersects the IS and NAC curves at the
steady state. We illustrate the determination of a steady state equilibrium in
Figure 1.2.
The IS curve, equation (1.30), is downward sloping and its position is deter-
mined by animal spirits, Θ. In a steady state equilibrium, beliefs about future
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Figure 1.2: The IS-LM-NAC Representation of the Steady State
wealth are self-fulfilling. When people feel wealthy, they are wealthy. Beliefs
about wealth determine consumption, and firms hire as much labor as necessary
to satisfy demand. The value of capital in a rational expectations equilibrium
adjusts to match the beliefs.
1.8 Two Comparative Static Exercises
In this section we ask how shifts in exogenous driving variables affect the equi-
librium values of Y , i and P . We conduct two comparative static exercises. In
the first exercise we increase Θ from a low value to a higher value at some date,
t = 1, and we assume that it remains constant thereafter. In the second exercise,
we hold Θ fixed forever and we increase the stock of money.17
Consider first, the experiment of an increase in the belief about the value of
financial wealth. A greater value of Θ influences output through two channels.
Firstly, since consumers believe, correctly, that they are wealthier, real consump-
tion of goods and services increases. The IS curve shifts to the right. Moreover,
higher asset prices reduce the interest rate and the NAC curve becomes flatter.
17In section 1.10 we consider an alternative model of expectation formation in which the belief
about the future value of capital is equal to its current realized value.
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These effects are illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: An Increase in Confidence
As people become more confident, the IS curves shifts to the right beginning at
the solid IS curve and ending at the dashed IS curve. At the same time, the NAC
curve shifts down and to the right, from the solid NAC to the dashed NAC curve.
Because output increases, the demand for real money balances increases, and the
price level must be lower in the new steady state equilibrium. This is reflected
on Figure 1.3 by a rightward shift in the LM curve. Because the class of Cobb-
Douglas utility functions implies a unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
the intertemporal substitution effect and the income effect cancel each other out
and, at the new equilibrium, the interest rate remains unchanged.
Consider next, the effect of an increase in the stock of money, which we illus-
trate on Figure 1.4.
Equations (1.30) and (1.32) determine the equilibrium values of output and the
interest rate independently of the stock of money. The demand for real balances
depends only on Y and i and, once these variables have been determined, the
price level, P, adjusts to equate the real value of the money supply to the real
value of money demand. It follows that changes in the supply of money will cause
proportional changes in the price level and the nominal value of wealth, leaving
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output and the interest rate unchanged.
Figure 1.4: An Increase in the Money Supply
Figure 1.4 illustrates the effects of a change in M on a graph. The LM curve
after the increase in the money supply is identical with the LM curve before the
change, illustrating the concept that money, in our model, is neutral. However, as
we will show in Section 1.10, this result depends on the form of the belief function.
If beliefs about the future value of financial wealth depend on the current realized
value of wealth, an increase in the money supply may have a permanent real effect
on output through its effect on business and consumer confidence.
1.9 Dynamic Equilibria
In this section we shift from a comparison of steady states to a description of
complete dynamic equilibria. To study the equilibria of the complete model, we
use the algorithm, GENSYS, developed by Christopher Sims (2001). First, we
choose a constant sequence {M,Θ} to describe policy and we log-linearize the
dynamic equations around a steady state. Let
xt ≡
[
yt, i˜t, pt, pK,t,Et [yt+1] ,Et [pt+1] ,Et [pK,t+1]
]′
(1.33)
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be log deviations of the endogenous variables from their steady state values. Let
εt ≡ [mt, θt]′ (1.34)
log deviations of the exogenous variables from their initial values and define three
new variables,
η1t ≡ pt − Et−1[pt], (1.35)
η2t ≡ pK,t − Et−1[pK,t], (1.36)
η3t ≡ yt − Et−1[yt]. (1.37)
These new variables represent endogenous forecast errors. Next, we log-linearize
equations (1.21) – (1.23) and equation (1.27) and we append them to equations
(1.35) – (1.37). That leads to the following linear system of seven equations in
seven unknowns,
Γ0xt = Γ1xt−1 + Ψεt + Πηt, (1.38)
The matrix Ψ is derived from the linearized equations and it explains how
shocks to M and shocks to Θ influence each of the equations of the model.
Once we have provided a model of beliefs, the steady state of our system is
determinate. For every specification of the belief function, equation (1.27), there
is a unique steady state. In this sense, our animal spirits model is similar to
any dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. For a given specification of
fundamentals, there is a unique predicted outcome.
But the fact that the model, augmented by a belief function, has a unique
steady state, is not enough to uniquely determine a dynamic equilibrium. To
establish uniqueness of a dynamic equilibrium, we must show that for every rep-
resentation of fundamentals, where fundamentals now include beliefs, there is a
unique dynamic path converging to the steady state. The uniqueness or non-
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uniqueness of dynamic equilibria is determined by the properties of the matrices
Γ0 and Γ1, in equation (1.38).
To establish the properties of a dynamic equilibrium, we must provide a cal-
ibrated version of the model since determinacy of equilibrium is, in general, a
numerical question. To study determinacy, we used the calibration from Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameter Definition Value
α Share of capital in output .33
β Subjective discount rate .50
δ Coefficient on real money balances in utility .05
For this calibration, we found that our model has one degree of indeterminacy.
In words, that implies that for any set of initial conditions there is a one dimen-
sional continuum of dynamic paths, all of which converge to a given steady state.
In practice, it means that the rational expectations assumption is not sufficient
to uniquely determine all three of the forecast errors, ηt, as functions of the fun-
damental shocks, εt. When the model displays dynamic indeterminacy, there are
many ways that people may use to forecast the future, all of which are consistent
with a rational expectations equilibrium (Farmer, 1991, 1999).
Following Farmer (2000), we resolve this indeterminacy by selecting a partic-
ular equilibrium for which
η1t ≡ pt − Et−1[pt] = 0. (1.39)
This equation is a special case of equation (1.35). In words, this assumption means
that money prices are set one period in advance. It is important to note that price
stickiness does not violate the property of rational expectations. The equilibrium
with sticky prices is one of many possible equilibria of the economy where agents
form self-fulfilling beliefs about wealth and it is an equilibrium that explains an
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important property of the data: Unanticipated monetary shocks have real short
run effects and they feed only slowly into prices.
In our model, the equilibrium is selected by the way that people form beliefs.
How should we view the choice of an equilibrium with predetermined prices?
Farmer has argued elsewhere (Farmer, 1999) that when there are multiple equi-
libria, we should allow the data to determine how people form beliefs in the real
world. It may be, for example, that a small but unmodeled cost of changing prices
leads market participants to an equilibrium where prices are predetermined. Here,
we choose to display the properties of the predetermined price equilibrium and we
refer the reader to the paper by Farmer and Nicolo` (2018) which provides evidence
that a predetermined price equilibrium of this kind is a good fit to US data.
1.10 Three Dynamic Experiments
In this section, using the parameter values from Table 1.1, we analyze three dy-
namic experiments. In the first experiment, we begin from a steady state, and
we ask how a permanent unanticipated increase in confidence affects the endoge-
nous variables of the model. In the second and third experiments, we ask how a
permanent unanticipated increase in the stock of money affects the economy.
In our second experiment, the belief of households about the future real value
of the stock market is invariant to its current value. In our third experiment,
households expect the future real value of the stock market to be equal to its
current value. We refer to the alternative assumptions in experiments two and
three as fixed and adaptive beliefs.
In the case of fixed beliefs, the experiment of increasing the money supply, has
the same long-run effects that it would have in a classical model in which output
is supply determined: Money is neutral. In contrast, if households form their
beliefs adaptively, a permanent increase in the money supply has a permanent
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effect on output. Money is non-neutral because it increases the real value of the
stock market in the short run and that increase is translated, through a confidence
effect, into a permanent increase in beliefs about the value of the stock market.
Is it reasonable to think that a change in a nominal variable may have per-
manent real effects? We think so. Farmer (2012a) and Farmer and Nicolo` (2018)
have estimated a model of the US economy in which beliefs about future income
growth are equal to current income growth and they have shown that a belief
function of this kind outperforms standard New-Keynesian models closed by a
Phillips curve. In their model, the central bank sets the money interest rate and
changes in the interest rate have a permanent effect on the unemployment rate
by shifting the economy from one equilibrium to another. In our model a similar
shift from one steady state equilibrium to another is achieved by an increase in
the money supply which raises share prices and has a permanent effect on animal
spirits.
1.10.1 Experiment 1: A Shock to Confidence
Figure 1.5 displays the dynamic paths of eight variables in response to a one
time increase in beliefs about the future value of capital. We call this a shock to
confidence.
Panel (a) depicts the value of beliefs about the future real value of the stock
market, Et [PK,t+1/Pt+1] . This is the variable we refer to as Θ. In our first ex-
periment, Θ increases by one percent and it remains one percent higher for ever
after. Panel (b) shows the value of the money supply, which we hold fixed for this
experiment.
Panel (c) shows that, in period 2, output increases and remains permanently
higher by one percent. This occurs because rational forward-looking consumers
increase their spending on goods and services and firms respond by hiring addi-
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Figure 1.5: A Permanent Shock to Confidence
tional workers to produce these goods. Panel (d) shows that the price level falls
and stays permanently lower. Greater output increases the demand for real money
balances and the price level must fall to equate the demand and supply of money.
Panel (e) shows that, in period 2, the realized value of real stock-market wealth
increases by one percent. That follows from the rational expectations assumption;
people expected the value of share prices to increase and, in a rational expectations
equilibrium, that belief is supported by the way that people form their beliefs in
period 2 and in all subsequent periods. From panel (g), we see that the real
interest rate jumps up in period 1 and reverts to its steady-state value thereafter.
Because the price level and the money interest rate do not adjust in the first
period, the real interest rate adjustment is achieved by a self-fulfilling adjustment
to the expected future price level.
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We want to draw attention to several features of these impulse responses.
First, although adjustment to a confidence shock is delayed, the delay lasts for
only one period. That follows from the stylized nature of a model in which there
are no endogenous propagation mechanisms. Second, prices do not respond at
all in the first period. In the New-Keynesian model, prices are sticky because
of adjustment costs or restrictions on choice. Although we are not averse to the
possibility that restrictions of this kind may be important in the real world, they
are not an essential element of our theory. In our model, prices are fixed because
people rationally anticipate that output, not prices, will respond to unanticipated
shocks.
If models in this class are to be taken seriously as descriptions of data, they
must be tied down by an assumption about how beliefs are formed. To give the
model empirical content, one must assume that the belief function remains time
invariant at least over the medium term. If that assumption holds, the parameters
of the belief function can be estimated in the same way that econometricians
estimate preference parameters. See Farmer (2012a) and Farmer and Nicolo` (2018)
for examples of empirical exercises that estimate a version of this model on U.S.
data. These papers tie down the equilibrium of the theoretical model by treating
the covariance of prices with contemporaneous variables as a parameter of the
belief function. In the empirical work of Farmer (2012a) and Farmer and Nicolo`
(2018), it is the sticky price equilibrium that best explains data.
1.10.2 Experiment 2: A Shock to the Money Supply with Fixed Beliefs
In subsections 1.10.2 and 1.10.3 we show that the way economic agents form beliefs
about the future matters for the long-term effect of monetary shocks.
In subsection 1.10.2, we consider the case of fixed beliefs, which we model with
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Figure 1.6: A Permanent Shock to the Supply of Money under Fixed Beliefs
equation (1.40),
Et
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= Θ. (1.40)
Figure 1.6 displays the dynamic paths for the variables of this economy in
response to a shock to the money supply when beliefs are modeled in this way.
This shock is reflected in Panel (b) which depicts the time path for M . We assume
that at date 1, M increases by one percent and that it remains one percent higher
forever after. Panel (a) reflects our assumption that beliefs are fixed.
Panel (c) shows that output increases temporarily in the first period by one
percent. This happens because prices are predetermined and are unable to adjust
until period 2. Instead, the increase in the money supply causes an increase in
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aggregate demand that is met by a corresponding temporary increase in output
and employment. Firms hire more workers to satisfy the increased aggregate
demand.
Panel (d) shows that prices respond in period 2 and remain 1 percent higher.
This increase neutralizes the increase in the money supply and is consistent with
the return to steady state of output reflected in panel (c). Panels (e) and (f) show
that the real value of shares in the stock market increases and then returns to its
original value. In contrast, the money value of shares in the stock market goes
up by one percent and remains permanently higher. From panel (g) we see that
the real interest rate falls in period 1 and panel (h) shows that the money interest
rate remains constant during the entire exercise.
1.10.3 Experiment 3: A Shock to the Money Supply with Adaptive
Beliefs
To model adaptive beliefs, we replace equation (1.40), with equation (1.41),
Et
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
=
PK,t
Pt
. (1.41)
When beliefs are adaptive, households expect the real value of the stock market
to be a random walk. This is a special case of a more general model in which
beliefs are formed by the following adaptive expectations equation,18
Et
[
PK,t+1
Pt+1
]
= λ
(
PK,t
Pt
)
+ (1− λ)Et−1
[
PK,t
Pt
]
, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1.7 displays the dynamic paths for the variables of this economy in
response to a shock to the money supply when beliefs about the real value of
18We have restricted ourselves to the special case of λ = 1 because Farmer (2012a) estimated
a model that allows λ to lie in the interval [0, 1] and found that empirically, the data favors a
model where λ = 1.
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shares in the stock market are determined by a random walk. We assume that
M increases by one percent and that it remains one percent higher for ever after.
The shock to the money supply is reflected in Panel (a).
The increase in the stock of money causes an increase in the money price
of financial assets; this is shown in Panel (f). Because the price of goods is
predetermined, the increase in the nominal share price is also an increase in its
real price as shown in Panel (e). Panel (b) shows that beliefs about the future
real value of shares respond to this monetary shock and they remain permanently
one percent higher in all subsequent periods.
Figure 1.7: A Permanent Shock to the Supply of Money under Adaptive Beliefs
Panel (c) shows that the increase in the real value of the stock market triggers
an increase in output that is sustained because of the effect of the increase in the
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money supply on beliefs, as reflected in Panel (b). Panels (d), (g) and (h) show
that the price level, and the real and nominal interest rates do not respond at all
to a one off permanent increase in the money supply which is reflected entirely in
changes to output and in the real value of financial assets.
1.11 Conclusion
We have proposed a fresh way of thinking about the monetary transmission mech-
anism. By integrating Keynesian economics with general equilibrium theory in a
new way, we have provided an alternative to the IS-LM framework that we call
the IS-LM-NAC model. Our new model provides an alternative narrative to New-
Keynesian economics to explain how macroeconomic policy influences prices and
employment.
Our approach differs from New Keynesian economics in two fundamental ways.
First, our model displays dynamic indeterminacy. We focus on a dynamic path
with predetermined prices to show that changes in the money supply may affect
real economic activity even if all nominal prices are perfectly flexible. Second, our
model displays steady state indeterminacy that arises as a consequence of search
frictions in the labor market. We replace the classical search assumption that firms
and workers bargain over the wage, with the Keynesian search assumption that
beliefs about the future value of the stock market select a steady-state equilibrium.
In our view, beliefs should be treated as a new fundamental of the model. The
belief function advances our understanding of why the unemployment rate is so
persistent in real world data.
Finally, we have presented a simple graphical apparatus that can be used by
policy makers to understand how policy affects the economy. A new element, the
NAC curve, connects the interest rate to current and expected future values of
the stock market and it explains how ‘animal spirits’ influence economic activity.
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The IS-LM-NAC framework provides a rich new approach to policy analysis that
explains the short-run and long-run effects of policy, without the assumption that
prices are prevented from moving by artificial barriers to price adjustment.
1.12 Extension: Generalizing our Approach
A referee has pointed out that our graphical method relies on the assumption
that only current income enters decision rules and asks if our model generalizes
to models of permanent income or models with long-lived agents. The answer is
yes.19
1.12.1 The Demand Side of the Economy
Here, we adapt the Blanchard perpetual youth model (Blanchard, 1985) to deliver
a version of the IS-LM-NAC model in steady state. To keep the presentation
simple, we assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty. The case of aggregate
uncertainty can be handled by modeling the pricing kernel using the work of
Farmer et al. (2011) and adapting the methods described in Farmer (2018).
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . There is a total mass of
population equal to 1. Every agent faces a constant probability λ of surviving
into the next period. At the beginning of each period, a fraction 1− λ of agents
die, and an equal mass of individuals is born. Generations are indexed by the
date of birth s. As in Blanchard (1985), we assume the existence of annuities and
19A second issue that was raised by a referee is whether our model would survive the intro-
duction of produced capital. We suspect that the answer is yes. But the model would need to
be more elaborate in other dimensions. In a one-sector model with reproducible capital, the rel-
ative price of capital is pinned down by technology and economic fluctuations cannot be driven
simply by the relative price of capital as they are in the model we present in this paper. To
give full justice to a model with reproducible capital it would seem to us, that either one should
build a two-sector model, or one would need to drop the assumption of a static labor market
by allowing for labor as a state variable. Either of those variations would permit the value of
the stock-market to diverge from the value of capital and allow the introduction of self-fulfilling
beliefs about the relative price of an asset to drive business cycle fluctuations.
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a competitive set of life insurance companies that pay every agent an additional
return to financial wealth in return for a claim on the agent’s wealth upon death.
Free entry guarantees zero profit of the insurance companies.
Conditional on surviving, agents discount the future at rate 0 < β < 1. Each
generation’s preferences are defined over sequences of consumption {Cst }∞t=s and
real money balances {M st+1/Pt}∞t=s,
∞∑
τ=0
(βλ)τ
(
(1− δ) logCst+τ + δ log
(
M st+1+τ
Pt+τ
))
,
where consumption and money holdings are indexed by the generation s for s ≤ t.
Households hold three assets: money balances, M st+1, that provide liquidity
services and enter the utility function, government bonds Bst+1 that pay the rate
of return it, and shares S
s
t+1 of a representative firm that has a value of Ft and
that pays dividends Dt. The flow budget constraint takes the form:
PtC
s
t +M
s
t+1 +B
s
t+1 + S
s
t+1Ft = WtL
s
t +
1
λ
[Sst (Dt + Ft) +M
s
t + (1 + it−1)B
s
t ] .
The term 1/λ in this expression represents the annuity premium paid by the life
insurance company in return for a claim on the agent’s wealth in the event of
death. We also assume that people are born with zero wealth; that is, Stt = 0 ,
M tt = 0, and B
t
t = 0.
Under the no arbitrage condition and assuming no uncertainty, the dollar
return to holding a government bond equals the dollar return to holding stock:
1 + it =
Dt+1 + Ft+1
Ft
.
Because preferences are given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, spending on
consumption and money holding are each equal to a constant fraction of each
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agent’s wealth:
PtC
s
t = (1− δ)(1− βλ)
[
1
λ
(Sst (Dt + Ft) +M
s
t + (1 + it−1)B
s
t ) +H
s
t
]
,
it
1 + it
M st+1 = δ(1− βλ)
[
1
λ
(Sst (Dt + Ft) +M
s
t + (1 + it−1)B
s
t ) +H
s
t )
]
,
where Hst is the nominal value of human wealth defined recursively as
Hst = WtL
s
t +
λ
1 + it
Hst+1.
Define the following aggregate variables:
Ct =
t∑
s=−∞
(1− λ)λt−sCst , Ht =
t∑
s=−∞
(1− λ)λt−sHst ,
Bt =
t∑
s=−∞
(1− λ)λt−sBst , St =
t∑
s=−∞
(1− λ)λt−sSst ,
Mt =
t∑
s=−∞
(1− λ)λt−sM st .
where recall that, in period t, the newborns have zero assets.
The demand side of the economy is completely described by the following three
equations:
PtCt = (1− δ)(1− βλ) [St(Dt + Ft) +Mt + (1 + it−1)Bt +Ht] ,
it
1 + it
Mt+1 = δ(1− βλ)[St(Dt + Ft) +Mt + (1 + it−1)Bt +Ht],
Ht = WtLt +
λ
1 + it
Ht+1,
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plus the no-arbitrage condition
1 + it =
Dt+1 + Ft+1
Ft
.
1.12.2 The Supply Side of the Economy
The production sector is comprised of a continuum of identical perfectly com-
petitive firms. Because all firms will make the same decisions, we consider the
problem of a representative producer.
The firm owns a unit of non-reproducible capital and hires labor to produce
goods. The production function is given by
Yt = X
1−α
t ,
where Xt is labor used in production.
In period t, the firm hires Lt workers that must be assigned to production, Xt,
and recruiting, Vt,
Lt = Xt + Vt.
Each worker assigned to recruiting hires qt workers,
Lt = qtVt.
The firm maximizes its value which equals the discounted present value of its cash
flow, all of which is paid out as dividends,
Dt = PtYt −WtLt.
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The value maximization problem is constrained by the following two equations,
Lt = Xt + Vt,
and
Lt = qtVt.
Because we assume that workers are fired and rehired every period, the firm’s
problem reduces to a sequence of static maximization problems with the following
first order condition which holds in every period,
(1− α)PtYt = WtLt.
Dividends, in the optimal solution, are given by
Dt = αPtYt.
At the aggregate level, there exists a matching technology,
qtV¯t = (ΓV¯t)
1
2 ,
and, in equilibrium, L¯t = Lt, V¯t = Vt, and Lt = (ΓVt)
1/2.
1.12.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a sequence of consumption, production, employment, asset hold-
ings and prices such that the above equations hold, the goods market clears,
Ct = Yt, the demand for money equals the fixed supply, Mt+1 = M
∗
t+1, debt is in
zero net supply, Bt+1 = 0, and the stock of capital is fixed, St+1 = 1. We allow
unemployment to be different from the social optimum and we close the model by
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assuming that agents form beliefs about the real value of the stock market,
Ft+1
Pt+1
= Θt.
1.12.4 Steady state
To derive the model equations in the steady state we first find expressions for Q,
V , X and Y as functions of steady-state employment, L. These functions are
derived as follows. Using the labor recruiting equation,
L = qV,
the labor allocation identity,
X + V = L,
plus the aggregate matching function and the production function we attain the
following steady-state relationships
q =
Γ
L
, V =
L2
Γ
, X = L− L
2
Γ
, Y =
(
L− L
2
Γ
)1−α
. (1.42)
Because the production function is non-monotonic in L we assume that in any
search equilibrium, the economy is on the rising part of the production function;
that is, L < Γ
2
. Given this assumption, for any
Y <
(
Γ
2
(
1− Γ
2
))1−α
,
we can find a unique value of L and, from equations (1.42) we can find expressions
for steady-state q, V and X . Further, from the first-order conditions of individual
firms we have,
WL
P
= (1− α)Y,
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and
D
P
= αY.
By substituting these expressions into the demand equations for consumption and
real balances and using goods market clearing, C = Y , the assumption that debt
is in zero net supply, B = 0, and the fact that there is a single non-reproducible
unit of capital, S = 1, we arrive at the following four equations in the five variables
Y , F/P , M/P , H/P , and i,
Y = (1− δ)(1− βλ)
[
αY +
F
P
+
M
P
+
H
P
]
, (1.43)
i
1 + i
M
P
= δ(1− βλ)
[
αY +
F
P
+
M
P
+
H
P
]
, (1.44)
H
P
= (1− α)Y + λ
1 + i
H
P
, (1.45)
1 + i =
αY + F/P
F/P
. (1.46)
To close the system we assume that beliefs about the stock market (animal spirits)
are given by the expression F/P = Θ. These four equations determine the four
real variables: Y , i, M/P , and H/P . The steady state price level, P , is determined
by the nominal money supply M .
Summarizing this discussion, we can characterize steady-state equilibrium in
a long-lived agent model with three equations. Two of these equations, the LM
curve and the no-arbitrage equation, are identical with the two-period-lived model.
These are given by the expressions,
M
P
=
δ
1− δ
1 + i
i
Y. (LM Curve)
and,
i =
αY
Θ
. (NAC Curve)
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Note that the LM curve has a positive slope in space (Y, i) space.
To obtain the IS curve, substitute for M/P and H/P in equation (1.43) and
divide both sides by Y to give:
1 = (1− δ)(1− βλ)
[
α +
Θ
Y
+
δ
1− δ
1 + i
i
+
1− α
1− λ
1+i
]
. (IS Curve)
By totally differentiating this equation and evaluating the partial derivatives at
the steady state one readily verifies that the IS curve defines a downward sloping
relationship in (Y, i) space. Further, one verifies that increases in confidence,
which we attribute to Θ, shifts the IS curve to the right.
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CHAPTER 2
The Forward Premium Anomaly:
Overlapping Generations, Multiple Equilibria,
and Shocks to Beliefs
2.1 Introduction
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) is a central concept in international finance.
Based on the principle of no arbitrage opportunities, UIP states that exchange
rates of high interest rate countries should depreciate over time. Under UIP,
investors engaging in the carry trade, i.e. those who borrow in a low interest
rate currency and invest in a high interest rate currency, should not be able
to earn systematic excess returns. Competitive international financial markets
should eliminate profitable opportunities, and any non-zero interest differential
should be offset by the subsequent dynamics of the exchange rate. In the data,
the opposite is true: high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate, opening up
profitable opportunities for the carry trade. Systematic observed violation of UIP
is known as the forward premium anomaly. Standard open economy models, in
which movements in the exchange rate are driven by fundamentals are unable to
generate a large and volatile risk premium. In contrast, I show that a model driven
by non-fundamental shocks (sunspots) can produce substantial movements in the
risk premium and that these movements are able to account for the profitability
of the carry trade.
40
Another empirical regularity concerns the connection between the current in-
terest differential and future excess returns on the carry trade. UIP predicts that
today’s interest differential should not be able to predict the profitability of the
carry trade in the future. However, the data demonstrate a strong correlation be-
tween current interest differentials and future excess returns: at a horizon of one
year and up, high interest rate currencies earn negative excess returns. Further-
more, co-existence of these two empirical findings, described above, constitutes
a third puzzle. A theory of the joint determination of exchange rates and inter-
est rates must explain why high interest rates predict positive excess returns on
the carry trade at short horizons but negative excess returns at longer horizons.
Models that attempt to rationalize the correlation between high interest rates and
negative excess returns typically assume that the UIP condition holds.
This paper explores a novel theoretical mechanism to explain the joint determi-
nation of exchange rates, interest rates and risk premia. A standard explanation
of the first empirical regularity suggests that the carry trade involves foreign ex-
change risk and that, as a consequence, investors demand a risk premium (e.g.
Backus et al. (1995). However, the second empirical observation implies that high
interest rates must be associated with a relatively small future risk. A complete
model must explain the reversal in the sign of the covariance between the interest
rate and excess returns over longer horizons.
This paper presents a simple stylized model to rationalize the observed link
between the interest rate differential, the exchange rate and the risk premium.
In my model, exchange rates are much more volatile than the underlying funda-
mentals. I propose a new source of fluctuations in exchange rates: volatile shocks
to beliefs about exchange rates. I assume that agents have rational expectations
and, to justify this assumption, I rely on the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria
caused by incomplete participation of investors in the financial market. Following
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the literature on sunspots and self-fulfilling prophecies1, I introduce incomplete
participation with a model of overlapping generations. The use of incomplete
participation to explain financial market anomalies is not new in the literature
(e.g. Alvarez and Jermann, 2001; Storesletten et al., 2007). Here, I apply it in
a novel way. Agents who are currently alive form expectations about the deci-
sions of future newborns. These expectations are summarized in expectations
about the future exchange rate. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, a range of
beliefs can be supported in equilibrium.2 Each dynamic path is associated with
different self-fulfilling beliefs about the future exchange rate. I impose a structure
for how self-fulfilling beliefs are formed, and I allow these beliefs to be subject
to shocks. Shocks to beliefs shift the economy from one equilibrium to another,
causing fluctuations in the exchange rate.
To keep the structure simple, I assume that there is no intrinsic uncertainty in
the model: endowments, preferences and policy are time and state invariant and
known by everyone. The only source of uncertainty is shocks to beliefs. These
shocks affect the current state of the economy but also determine expectations
about the future. Shocks to beliefs are sunspot shocks (as in Cass and Shell,
Cass and Shell), they are not related to the fundamentals. Instead, they appear
as investor sentiments that might be explained as the result of narratives. The
beliefs of agents will turn out to be correct, as long as future agents continue to
form beliefs in the same way. Shocks to beliefs affect the economy directly by
redistributing wealth across the two countries and changing domestic and foreign
interest rates. This mechanism leads to foreign exchange risk that causes high
interest currencies to pay a risk premium in equilibrium. Following Farmer (1999,
2013) and Farmer and Platonov (2019), I introduce a belief function that describes
the formation of beliefs about the real exchange rate, and I assume that these
1This literature was pioneered by Cass and Shell (1983), Azariadis (1981), Farmer and Wood-
ford (1997).
2See also Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) and Demichelis and Polemarchakis (2007)
on multiplicity of equilibria in economies with overlapping generations.
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beliefs are subject to time-varying volatility. The assumption of time-varying
stochastic volatility of the belief function is new to this paper, and it is this
assumption that allows me to solve the forward premium anomaly.
Violation of uncovered interest parity is explained as follows. When agents
believe that the exchange rate will appreciate, they prefer to borrow in a foreign
currency and invest in the domestic currency. When all else is equal, the expected
appreciation will deliver profit from the carry trade. However, agents, recognizing
that there is foreign exchange risk, will demand excess returns to compensate
them for this risk. This risk premium causes the domestic interest rate to increase
relative to the foreign interest rate. If agents believe that periods with high
uncertainty precede periods of low uncertainty, they will expect negative excess
returns in the future. This reversal in volatility explains the sign reversal of
expected returns over longer horizons.
To test my theory empirically, I investigate the ability of lagged expectations to
help explain the UIP anomalies. In my model, the period t− 1 expectation about
the period t exchange rate is a state variable. What agents believed the equilib-
rium would be, matters for the subsequent dynamics of the economy. Typically,
past expectations appear as a state variable in multiple equilibria models and
they do not enter as state variables models with a unique equilibrium driven by
fundamentals. A multiple equilibria model is, for this reason, a natural candidate
to explain the UIP anomalies.
When testing UIP empirically, I show that estimates of past expectations,
generated by a vector error correction model, explain much of the deviation from
UIP. In the case of Japan, the forward premium anomaly and the reversal puzzle
disappear completely once past expectations are controlled for. For the other G7
countries, the covariance between interest differentials and excess returns becomes
substantially closer to zero when past expectations are taken into account. These
findings suggest that past expectations matter for the determination of the current
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exchange rate and the interest differential.
There are two key assumptions in the model. First, incomplete participation
generates a multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. This allows me to impose a rule
that selects the equilibrium, and I postulate it in a form of beliefs about the real
exchange rate. Following Farmer (1999), I call it a belief function. Introduction of
the belief function does not violate the rational expectations assumption; it simply
puts a Markovian structure on the manifold of equilibria. Second, I assume that
shocks to beliefs have time-varying volatility (in the spirit of Bansal and Yaron,
2004) and that this volatility depends on the history of the realized shocks, as
in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process (Cox et al., 1985). This makes interest rates
correlate with the risk premium.
The overlapping generations structure rationalizes another puzzle, the Backus-
Smith puzzle (Backus and Smith, 1993). In the data, relative aggregate consump-
tion exhibits a weakly negative correlation with the real exchange rate. The vast
majority of international economics models produce a positive correlation because
the real exchange rate is determined by the relative supply of goods. In my model,
the exchange rate is determined by the relative demand for goods. When domestic
consumption is high, due to home bias in consumption, the price of the domestic
good is high relatively to the price of the foreign good, and the real exchange rate
is low.
Engel (2016) and Valchev (2017) document the puzzle regarding the rever-
sal in the sign of the covariance between the interest differential and the risk
premium, and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2018), Engel (2016), Itskhoki and
Mukhin (2017), and Valchev (2017) offer explanations of this puzzle. This paper
contributes to this literature. My model differs crucially in what drives uncer-
tainty. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2018) consider delayed portfolio adjustment,
Engel (2016) studies shocks to assets of various liquidity, Valchev (2017) looks at
interaction of monetary and fiscal policy, and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) assume
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the risk premium is subject to financial shocks that hit the Euler equation directly.
In contrast, my model is driven by shocks to self-fulfilling beliefs. Papers that ex-
plain why high interest rates are associated with low risk usually assume that
UIP holds, and papers that account for the violation of UIP cannot explain the
reversal. My paper can explain the forward premium anomaly and the reversal
in a single framework.
More generally, my paper bridges three literatures: Survey-based evidence for
violation of UIP, theoretical explanations based on the time-varying risk premium
under rational expectations and non-rational expectations. Backus et al. (1995),
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), Colacito and Croce (2013), Farhi and Gabaix
(2015), Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), and Verdelhan (2010) build a model where
volatile fundamentals drive the risk premium. Alvarez et al. (2009) study a model
where the risk premium arises due to incomplete participation of investors in
the financial markets. However, Burnside et al. (2010) shows that fundamentals
cannot explain the observed excess returns on the carry trade. Froot and Frankel
(1989) and Bussiere et al. (2018) use surveys about the expected exchange rate
to conclude that UIP is violated due to expectational errors and not uncertainty
about fundamentals. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2007), Burnside (2011), Ilut
(2012), and Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) abandon rational expectations. This
paper connects these literatures by using the machinery developed for unique
equilibria models but letting the exchange rate be driven by beliefs, and the risk
premium be associated with volatile exchange rates, not the fundamentals of the
economy.
The mechanism of my model relies on the existence of a multiplicity of dynamic
equilibria (dynamic indeterminacy). The indeterminacy is of the same kind as
in Farmer and Woodford (1997) where the overlapping generations demography
makes expectations about the future self-fulfilling. I also rely on the indeterminacy
of exchange rates in an overlapping generations economy of the kind introduced
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by Kareken and Wallace (1981). I extend their analysis by introducing a belief
function. My work generalizes the models of dynamic indeterminacy surveyed in
Farmer (2016b) by allowing for time-varying volatility in the belief process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the evidence on
interest rate differentials and excess returns. Section 2.3 develops an intentionally
stylized two-country model with international trade and capital flows. Section
2.4 establishes the existence of dynamic indeterminacy and introduces the belief
function. Section 2.5 studies the stochastic properties of the simulated model,
the response of the economies to the shocks and demonstrates the main result.
Section 2.6 discusses the chosen modeling approach and its implications.
2.2 Evidence on Uncovered Interest Parity
This section reproduces the well-documented evidence on violation of uncovered
interest parity (UIP) for nominal and real interest rates, and nominal and real
exchanges rates. Violation of UIP has been widely documented, e.g. Bilson (1981),
Fama (1984), Backus et al. (1995), Engel (1996, 2016) and others. Empirical tests
of UIP have received a lot of attention in the literature for two reasons. First,
most open economy models predict UIP and rely on its implications. Second, UIP
robustly fails for many high-income low-inflation country pairs. Understanding
why UIP fails is detrimental for understanding the dynamics of the exchange rates.
2.2.1 Nominal Interest Rates and Nominal Exchange Rates
Let st be the nominal exchange rate of a foreign currency vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar
expressed as the amount of dollars per unit of the foreign currency. As is common
in the literature, the United States is always the home country. Let it and i
∗
t be
the monthly riskless money interest rate in the home and foreign countries respec-
tively. These interest rates are determined in period t and pay off in period t+ 1.
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An investor faces a choice of investing in a domestic safe asset or a foreign
safe asset. The total return on the foreign safe asset, however, is random as it
includes depreciation of the domestic currency. A standard textbook indifference
condition for a risk-neutral investor states that, if investors are risk neutral, the
following condition must hold:
1 + it = (1 + i
∗
t )
Et [st+1]
st
,
or approximately in logs,
Et [∆ log st+1] = it − i∗t .
This condition states that, on average, the two investment opportunities are ex-
pected to deliver the same rate of return. If, for instance, the domestic interest rate
exceeds the foreign interest rate by 1%, rational investors should expect deprecia-
tion of 1%, so that there are no expected gains from carry trade. The expression
ρt+1 = ∆ log st+1 + i
∗
t − it,
represents excess returns on carry trade, which should on average be equal to zero
and should not exhibit a non-zero correlation with the interest rate differential
i∗t − it. If there were systematic correlation, investors would take on this profitable
opportunity, and the exchange rate would adjust in such way that positive excess
returns are eliminated.
Definition 1. Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) holds if in the regression (called
the Fama regression),
ρt+1 = a+ b(i
∗
t − it) + ut+1 (2.1)
47
Table 2.1: The Fama Regression
Country Slope bˆ 90% Interval Intercept aˆ 90% Interval
Canada 2.271 (1.186, 3.355) −.045 (−.250, .160)
France 1.216 (−.171, 2.603) −.028 (−.346, .290)
Germany 2.091 (.599, 3.583) .192 (−.136, .520)
Japan 3.713 (2.390, 5.036) .924 (.504, 1.343)
United Kingdom 3.198 (1.170, 5.225) −.410 (−.768, −.051)
G6 2.467 (.769, 4.164) .054 (−.184, .292)
Note: Estimates of the regression ρt+1 = a+b(i
∗
t − it)+ut+1. Under UIP, b = 0. The confidence
intervals are based on the Newey-West robust standard errors. Monthly data, 1979:6–2009:10.
Reproduced from Engel (2016).
the slope coefficient b is equal to zero.34
Table 2.1 displays estimates of the Fama equation (2.1) for a variety of high-
income low-inflation countries and reproduces the findings previously documented
in the literature. For all currencies the point estimates of b are positive and, except
for France, statistically different from zero. For France, the confidence interval lies
primarily above zero, although it includes zero.5 Positive slopes mean that high
interest rate currencies tend to systematically earn excess returns and that the
exchange rate does not adjust to cancel the expected profit from the carry trade.
In fact, when b > 1, there are not only expected excess returns due to the interest
rate differential, but also the exchange rate moves in the opposite direction than
predicted by theory. For instance, for Canada the slope estimate of 2.271 means
that when the interest rate in Canada denoted i∗t exceeds the interest in the United
States denoted it, by 1%, an investor borrowing in the U.S. dollars and investing
3Some versions of this definition impose a = 0 and b = 0.
4An equivalent way to define UIP is to require that, in the regression ∆ log st+1 = a˜+ b˜(it −
i∗t ) + ut+1, the slope coefficient b˜ = 1. Note that these parameters are related to those in (2.1)
by a = a˜ and b = 1− b˜.
5Before adoption of the euro, Germany and France were part of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism and kept their exchange rates fixed to each other. Provided that Germany
represents a stronger economy than the French one, monetary policy in France can be considered
as adjusting the exchange rate of the French frank to the Deutschemark. This explains why the
confidence interval for the slope estimate for France includes zero.
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in Canadian dollars is expected to earn 2.271% profit, where 1% comes from the
interest rate differential and 1.271% comes from the favorable depreciation of the
U.S. dollar. For all the pairs of currencies, except the yen and the pound sterling,
the intercept is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Lemma 1. Under UIP, if the slope parameter b in the Fama equation (2.1) is
greater than 1/2, excess returns ρt+1 must be more volatile than the exchange rate
∆ log st+1:
var(ρt+1) > var(∆ log st+1).
Proof. Under the null that UIP holds, the probability limit of the estimator bˆ in
the Fama regression (2.1) is given by
plim bˆ =
cov(ρt+1, i
∗
t − it)
var(i∗t − it)
=
cov(∆ log st+1, ρt+1 −∆ log st+1)
var(ρt+1 −∆ log st+1) .
The requirement that plim bˆ > 1/2 is equivalent to var(ρt+1) > var(∆ log st+1).
Lemma 1 states that an explanation of UIP must explain why excess returns
ρt+1 (and, under rational expectations, expected excess returns Et [ρt+1]) are more
volatile than the exchange rate ∆ log st+1. This constitutes a challenge for models
where uncertainty is related to the fundamentals.
2.2.2 UIP and the Real Interest Rates
This section documents the violation of UIP and the forward premium anomaly
for real interest rates. Because the ex-ante (expected) real interest rates are
unobserved, they must be estimated before testing UIP. The methodology of this
section is based on Engel (2016).
49
Define the real exchange rate
log qt = log st + log p
∗
t − log pt
where pt and p
∗
t are the consumer price indices. Let the ex-ante real interest rate
be
rt = it − Et [∆ log pt+1] , r∗t = i∗t − Et
[
∆ log p∗t+1
]
.6
The ex-ante counterpart of the Fama regression with real interest rates would be
the equation,
Et [∆ρt+1] = α + β(r∗t − rt) + vt (2.2)
where vt is the error term.
To estimate the expected real depreciation rate and the ex-ante real interest
rate, I construct a vector error correction model (VECM) in three variables: the
nominal exchange rate, the nominal interest differential, and the price differential.
Let
xt =

log st
it − i∗t
log p∗t − log pt
 .
The empirical model takes the form
∆xt = Axt−1 + A0 +
L∑
l=1
Al∆xt−l + et. (2.3)
where A, A0 and Al, l = 1, . . . , L are the conforming matrices of the coefficients to
be estimated, and et is the error term. Matrix A is constrained in such a way that
the real exchange rate is stationary. Having estimated the vector error correction
model, I obtain the estimates of the expected excess returns Eˆt [ρt+1] and of the
6This is an approximation of the real interest rate as this definition omits the inflation risk
premium. Ang et al. (2008) study the inflation risk and the real interest rates in the United
States in detail.
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Table 2.2: The Fama Regression with Real Interest Differential
Model A Model B
Country βˆ 90% Interval βˆ′ 90% Interval γˆ 90% Interval
Canada .735 (.140, 1.295) .380 (−.142, .902) .186 (−.014, .387)
France 1.328 (.825, 1.831) .790 (.277, 1.303) .542 (.365, .719)
Germany 1.592 (.569, 2.615) .580 (.084, 1.076) .525 (.384, .667)
Japan 2.233 (1.719, 2.887) −.198 (−.714, .319) .888 (.786, .990)
United Kingdom 1.843 (1.347, 2.335) .571 (.279, .864) .774 (.680, .867)
G6 1.886 (1.201, 2.562) .918 (.322, 1.314) .647 (.497, .797)
Note: Model A: Eˆt [ρt+1] = α + β(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + vt and β is reported. Model B: Eˆt [ρt+1] =
α′ + β′(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + γEˆt−1 [ρt] + wt and β′ and γ are reported. The point estimates and the
confidence intervals are bootstrapped. L = 3 in the VECM. Monthly data, 1979:6–2009:10.
real interest differential (rˆ∗t − rˆt) by using
Eˆt [∆xt+1] = Aˆxt + Aˆ0 +
L∑
l=1
Aˆl∆xt−l+1 (2.4)
where the “hats” denote the OLS estimates of the parameters of the empirical
model and of the implied expectations. Estimates of j-step ahead expectations
Eˆt [∆xt+j] are constructed in the same way.
The estimates of the Fama slope β in real terms from (2.2) are presented in
column (A) of Table 2.2. The slopes are statistically above 1/2, except for Canada.
For Canada, the point estimate is positive and greater than 1/2; the confidence
interval excludes zero. This confirms the violation of UIP in real terms for all the
countries in the sample and existence of the forward premium anomaly, when the
real exchange rates and real interest rates are considered, and suggests that this
regularity is not a purely monetary phenomenon.
2.2.3 UIP and Expectations
This section presents the main empirical contribution of the paper. It shows that
the Forward Premium Anomaly arises due to the process for market expectations.
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The positive estimates of the Fama slope βˆ could be caused by an omitted
confounding factor that is correlated with the error term vt in the Fama regression
(2.2). Under the null hypothesis that UIP holds, i.e. the true parameter β = 0,
the estimator βˆ measures the covariance of the interest rate differential with the
expected excess returns:
plim βˆ =
cov(rˆ∗t − rˆt, vt)
var(rˆ∗t − rˆt)
.
If the covariance of the error term with the interest rate differential is large and
positive, the resulting estimates will be positive.
I find that past expectations about the excess returns are negatively correlated
with the real interest differential, driving the Fama estimates negative, and that
they explain the Forward Premium Anomaly and from 70% to 100% of the viola-
tion of UIP as measured by an increase in the slope estimate of the Fama regression
β in (2.2). I estimate the Fama equation again where I add the expectations made
at time t− 1 about the excess returns earned in period t:
Eˆt [ρt+1] = α′ + β′(rˆt − rˆ∗t ) + γEˆt−1 [ρt] + wt. (2.5)
The estimated coefficients β′ and γ are presented in Table 2.2, column (B).
It shows that for all countries in the sample the inclusion of past expectations
makes the coefficient on the interest smaller and closer to zero. Controlling for
past expectations, positive interest differentials predict depreciation, consistent
with UIP. For Canada and Japan, the slope becomes statistically indistinguishable
from unity, so that the past expectations fully explain the violation of UIP. For
Germany, the lower bound of the confidence interval does not reach zero but is
very close to it. For the other countries, the slope is still statistically above zero,
but, nevertheless, the estimates turn smaller than one and closer to zero.
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The violation of UIP implies ex-ante (and ex-post) profitability of the carry
trade. This section shows that profitability is explained by past expectations.
For all the countries the estimates of γ are statistically positive. One possible
explanation for this result is that investors extrapolate past expectations and that
they earn excess returns simply because they expected profits in the past. Patterns
of this kind have been found for other assets (e.g. Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014).
2.2.4 The Reversal
UIP states that on average (and in expectation) excess returns on the carry trade
must be zero. Consequently, the current interest differential must not be able to
predict future excess returns at any horizon.
Engel (2016) and Valchev (2017) investigate how the current interest rate
differential predicts excess returns in the future. They document the reversal of
the Fama slope over time. Consider the regression
Eˆt [ρt+j] = α˜j + β˜j(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + vjt. (2.6)
Under UIP, β˜j = 0 for any horizon j and β˜j > 0 means profitability of the carry
trade in the way that was documented before.
Engel and Valchev find that the estimate of the slope β˜j is positive and dimin-
ishes to zero on a horizon of around one year (j = 12). It then turns negative,
reaching its minimum within a range of (−.8, −.2), depending on the country, and
slowly converging to zero. Fig. 2.1 reproduces this finding. It plots the estimates
of β˜j against the time horizon j. The current interest differential predicts positive
excess returns (in line with the violation of UIP) on a horizon up to one year
and negative excess returns thereafter. Engel interprets this finding as follows:
a higher domestic interest rate predicts bigger risk in the short run and much
smaller risk thereafter.
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I show that much of such behavior of the expected excess returns can be
attributed to the process for market expectations. Following the approach in the
previous section, I estimate the same regression, as (2.6), with an addition of past
expectations about excess returns:
Eˆt [ρt+j] = α˜′j + β˜′j(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + γ˜jEˆt−1 [ρt−1+j] + wjt. (2.7)
and I display the results on two figures. Fig. 2.2 plots the estimates of β˜′j and
their confidence intervals against the time horizon j, along with the confidence
bounds for β˜j from regression (2.6) indicated as the gray area. Fig. 2.3 plots the
estimates of γ˜j and their confidence bounds.
Fig. 2.2 clearly shows that the inclusion of past expectations explains a big
portion of the dynamics of the excess returns. When past expectations are taken
into consideration, the Fama slopes become much closer to zero. The difference in
β˜j and β˜
′
j is statistically significant. For Japan, past expectations make the Fama
slope insignificant at all horizons, thus fully accounting for the violation of UIP.
For other countries, the estimates of β˜′j still display the reversal but of a much
smaller magnitude.
Similarly to the previous section, I find that investors tend to extrapolate
past expectations into the future. This can be seen on Fig. 2.3. It shows the
coefficients on past expectations. For all of the countries in the sample, the
coefficient γ′t is statistically positive and close to one. For Japan, the coefficient
is indistinguishable from one. This implies that investors engaging in the carry
trade with the yen and the U.S. dollar, tend to impose their past expectations
onto the future. This is also true for Canada and France. For the rest of the
countries, the importance of past expectations declines as the horizon widens, but
it remains very high.
The evidence from the first part of this paper suggests that past expectations
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play a crucial role in the determination of exchange rates and interest rates. This
provides a natural scope for multiple equilibria models where past expectations
appear as a state variable.
2.3 The Model
In this section I construct a model that features a real endowment two-country
two-good two-period overlapping generations model. Time t is discreet and never
ends. Let j = 1, 2 index the generations. Foreign variables will be marked by
asterisk. The two countries are identical except that they differ in their values for
the subjective discount factor: β 6= β∗. I will assume β > β∗ and will refer to the
first country as home and the other country as foreign.
2.3.1 Uncertainty
There is no intrinsic uncertainty; preferences, endowments, and policy are known
by every agent and are constant over time. The only source of uncertainty is
the sunspot variable εt that is distributed normally with zero mean, standard
deviation of 1, and zero autocorrelation of any order.
The exogenous state, zt, depends on the realization of εt and represents shocks
to beliefs about the real exchange rate qt:
log qt+1 = Et [log qt+1] + zt+1. (2.8)
The state zt+1 evolves according to the Cox et al. (1985) law:
zt+1 = σεt+1
√
zt + λ1zt−1 + . . .+ λpzt−p + ϕ (2.9)
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Figure 2.1: The Fama Slope over Various Horizons
Note: The slope estimate βˆj from the regression Eˆt [ρt+j ] = αj + βj(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + vjt. The 95%
confidence intervals are based on the Newey-West standard errors. The horizontal axis measures
the horizon j in months. The vertical axis measures the slope estimate βˆj . Monthly data,
1979:6–2009:10.
56
Figure 2.2: The Fama Slope over Various Horizons Controlling for Past Expecta-
tions
Note: The slope estimate βˆ′j from the regression Eˆt [ρt+j ] = α′j +β′j(rˆ∗t − rˆt) + γjEˆt−1 [ρt−1+j ] +
wjt. The 95% confidence intervals are based on the Newey-West standard errors. The horizontal
axis measures the horizon j in months. The vertical axis measures the slope estimate βˆ′j . The
gray area represents the confidence bounds from Fig. 2.1. Monthly data, 1979:6–2009:10.
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Figure 2.3: Past Expectations in the Fama Regression over Various Horizons
Note: The slope estimate γˆj from the regression Eˆt [ρt+j ] = α′j+β′j(rˆ∗t−rˆt)+γjEˆt−1 [ρt−1+j ]+ujt.
The 95% confidence intervals are based on the Newey-West standard errors. The horizontal axis
measures the horizon j in months. The vertical axis measures the slope estimate γˆ′j . Monthly
data, 1979:6–2009:10.
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where σ > 0 and ϕ > 0.7 This law of motion implies the following conditional
distributions of zt+1:
zt+1|t ∼ N
(
0, σ2(zt + λ1zt−1 + . . .+ λpzt−p + ϕ)
)
,
i.e. the conditional mean of zt+1 is equal to zero and its conditional variance is
time-varying: it depends on the history. The zero conditional mean of zt+1 ensures
that the expectations are rational.8
The unconditional distribution of zt+1 is characterized by the moments
E[zt+1] = 0, var(zt+1) = σ2ϕ.
For the baseline model, I will consider the specification with p = 0. Under this
convenient assumption, the exogenous state is summarized by a single variable zt.
In general, however, the state is described by zt and its lags.
Let history ht = (z0, z1, . . . , zt) be a collection of realized states up to time t.
Every variable x in the model depends on the history: xt = x(ht) and all future
realizations are indexed by the future state xt+1(ht, z) which will be written simply
as xt+1(z). The rational expectations are defined as the mathematical expectation
over all possible future realizations of xt+1(ht, z) given the observed history ht:
Et[xt+1] =
∫
z
xt+1(ht, z)dF (ht, z)
where F is the distribution of zt+1 described above. All other moments of xt+1
are defined in a similar way.
7Under this specification, there is a positive probability that the expression inside the square
root becomes negative. As Backus et al. (1998) mention, this probability shrinks to zero as
the time interval becomes infinitesimally small. The presence of a constant ϕ will affect only
means of the variables. In simulations, whenever the expression inside the square root becomes
negative, I replace it with a very small number.
8To see this, take the time t conditional expectation from both sides of (2.8) to obtain an
identity.
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2.3.2 Agents
There are two tradable goods: a and b. In each country, the young generation
is endowed with the local good y¯1 and y¯
∗
1 respectively, and the old generation
is endowed with y¯2 and y¯
∗
2 units of the local good. I will assume y¯1 = y¯
∗
1 and
y¯2 = y¯
∗
2. The goods are perishable, so that the total endowments of (y¯1 + y¯2) and
(y¯∗1 + y¯
∗
2) must be consumed each period. The agents trade goods internationally
and consume a basket of domestic and imported goods.
Each generation j purchases a consumption basket which is a CES aggregator
of the domestic good ajt and the foreign good bjt:
cjt =
(
ω
1
η (ajt)
η−1
η + (1− ω) 1η (bjt)
η−1
η
) η
η−1
. (2.10)
The goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, with the elasticity of substitu-
tion η ≥ 1 (the case η = 1 would correspond to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator). The
home good is the numeraire, and all the prices are quoted in terms of the home
good. The price of the foreign good (the relative price) is pt and the prices of the
consumption goods are respectively pct and p
c∗
t . The prices of the consumption
goods must satisfy
pct =
(
ω + (1− ω) (pt)1−η
) 1
1−η . (2.11)
pc∗t =
(
ω (pt)
1−η + (1− ω)) 11−η . (2.12)
Agents of each generation in each country solve the static problem of minimiz-
ing expenditure on the consumption basket. The implied demand functions are
ajt = ω
(
1
pct
)−η
cjt, bjt = (1− ω)
(
pt
pct
)−η
cjt. (2.13)
b∗jt = ω
(
pt
pc∗t
)−η
c∗jt, a
∗
jt = (1− ω)
(
1
pc∗t
)−η
c∗jt. (2.14)
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The utility function of the young generation is defined over the consumption
basket in the first period c1t and a set of consumption baskets in the second period
realized under all possible possible future states.
c1−θ1t
1− θ + βEt
[
c1−θ2t+1
1− θ
]
. (2.15)
with a constant parameter of risk aversion θ > 0 and with θ = 1 being log utility.
Asset markets are sequentially complete. There is a whole set of state-contingent
Arrow securities ξt+1(z) that deliver a unit of the consumption basket upon the re-
alization of a particular state z. The probability-adjusted price of such a security
(the stochastic discount factor) is denoted mt+1. The period budget constraints
are given by
pctc1t = y¯1 + Et [mt+1ξt+1] , (2.16)
pctc2t = y¯2 + ξt. (2.17)
For the foreign country, the equations are similar:
pc∗t c
∗
1t = pty¯
∗
1 + Et
[
mt+1ξ
∗
t+1
]
, (2.18)
pc∗t c
∗
2t = pty¯
∗
2 + ξ
∗
t . (2.19)
Since the young generation has access to a complete set of contingent securities,
there exist two present-value budget constraints:
pctc1t + Et
[
mt+1p
c
t+1c2t+1
]
= y¯1 + Et [mt+1pt+1] y¯2. (2.20)
pc∗t c
∗
1t + Et
[
mt+1p
c
t+1c
∗
2t+1
]
= pty¯
∗
1 + Et [mt+1pt+1] y¯∗2. (2.21)
The young agents decide how much to consume and how much to save by
maximizing (2.15) subject to (2.20). The first order conditions are given by the
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following Euler equations that hold state by state:
mt+1(z) = β
(
c2t+1(z)
c1t
)−θ
pct
pct+1(z)
, (2.22)
mt+1(z) = β
∗
(
c∗2t+1(z)
c∗1t
)−θ
pc∗t
pc∗t+1(z)
. (2.23)
Equations (2.22) and (2.23) state that consumers equalize the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution calculated in terms of the home good to the stochastic discount
factor. Note that there is no expectations operator as, due to the market com-
pleteness, agents are able achieve this equality in any possible state of the world.
2.3.3 Government
The government issues state-contingent bonds ξgt+1(z) that can be positive (gov-
ernment is in debt) or negative (government holds wealth). The bonds are rolled
over from a period to period. For simplicity, the government neither collects taxes
nor purchases consumption goods. This implies the following law of motion for
public debt:
Et
[
mt+1ξ
g
t+1
]
= ξgt . (2.24)
The price of the bonds is determined only by their resale value. The young
agents will purchase government bonds only if they expect that the future young
generation will buy these bonds from them.
The role of the government in this economy is passive. The only sustainable
policy will be issuing as many bonds as is demanded by the private sector. I impose
a terminal condition that public debt remains bounded in equilibrium.
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2.3.4 Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and Risk Sharing
The real exchange rate qt is defined as the relative price of home and foreign
consumption goods:
qt ≡ p
c∗
t
pct
, (2.25)
so that an increase in qt means real depreciation for the home country.
The Euler conditions (2.22) and (2.23) lead to the following risk sharing con-
dition:
β
(
c2t+1
c1t
)−θ
pct
pct+1
= β∗
(
c∗2t+1
c∗1t
)−θ
pc∗t
pc∗t+1
. (2.26)
Define mct+1 and m
c∗
t+1 the stochastic discount factors quoted in terms of home
and foreign consumption goods respectively. The risk sharing condition can be
rewritten as
mct+1
qt+1
qt
= mc∗t+1. (2.27)
Finally, define the real interest rates as follows:
exp(−rt) = Et
[
mct+1
]
, (2.28)
exp(−r∗t ) = Et
[
mc∗t+1
]
. (2.29)
Under the log-normal distribution of the innovations in the model (and as a
second-order approximation in general), the risk sharing condition and the defini-
tion of the real interest rates are combined to obtain an equation that relates the
expected depreciation rate, the interest rate differential, and the risk premium:
Et [∆ log qt+1] = rt − r∗t +
1
2
(
vart
(
logmct+1
)− vart (logmc∗t+1)) . (2.30)
Note that this equation relies only on the existence of the stochastic discount
factors and on sequential completeness of the financial markets and does not
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depend on the structure of the model.
Equation (2.30) states that the expected depreciation rate, Et [∆ log qt+1], con-
sists of two parts: the interest rate differential, (rt − r∗t ), and the risk premium
equal to one half of the difference in conditional variances of the log stochastic
discount factors. Rewrite the risk sharing condition to arrive at an analogue of
the Fama regression:
Et [ρt+1] ≡ Et [∆ log qt+1] + r∗t − rt =
1
2
(
vart
(
logmct+1
)− vart (logmc∗t+1)) (2.31)
This equation states that the expected excess returns are proportional to the
differential of the conditional variances of the stochastic discount factors. To
explain the forward premium anomaly, the expression on the right-hand side of
the equation above must be positively correlated with the real interest differential
r∗t − rt. In equilibrium, both r∗t − rt and Et [ρt+1] will be driven by the single state
zt and, as I show, have the correlation of the right sign.
2.3.5 Beliefs
The model described above admits a multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. To put a
structure on the manifold of dynamic paths, I introduce a belief function about
the real exchange rate:
log qt+1 = Et [log qt+1] + zt+1 (2.32)
where zt+1 is the factor that drives the beliefs. In the absence of intrinsic uncer-
tainty, the variable zt+1 represents self-fulfilling shocks to the relative price qt+1.
Were there no multiplicity of equilibria, the only stationary equilibrium would
impose zero loading on the sunspot factor zt+1.
Once an assumption is made about the formation of beliefs, the dynamic equi-
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librium becomes unique. This way, the belief function selects a particular dynamic
equilibrium.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
Definition 2. A sequential rational expectations equilibrium in this economy is
a collection of history-dependent consumption allocations {c1t, c2t} and {c∗1t, c∗2t},
relative prices {pt, pct , pc∗t , qt}, the stochastic discount factor {mt} and quantities
of contingent assets {ξt+1(z), ξ∗t+1(z), ξgt+1(z)}z such that, given the law of motion
of the exogenous state,
zt+1 = σεt+1
√
zt + ϕ, εt+1 ∼ iid N (0, 1), (2.33)
the following equations hold (some of them repeated here for convenience):
1. The young generations’ Euler equations hold:
mt = β
(
c2t
c1t−1
)−θ pct−1
pct
, (2.34)
mt = β
∗
(
c∗2t
c∗1t−1
)−θ pc∗t−1
pc∗t
. (2.35)
2. The young generations’ present value budget constraints hold:
pctc1t + Et
[
mt+1p
c
t+1c2t+1
]
= y¯1 + Et [mt+1] y¯2, (2.36)
pc∗t c
∗
1t + Et
[
mt+1p
c∗
t+1c
∗
2t+1
]
= pty¯
∗
1 + Et [mt+1pt+1] y¯∗2. (2.37)
3. The old consume their wealth:
pctc2t = y¯2 + ξt, (2.38)
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pc∗t c
∗
2t = pty¯
∗
2 + ξ
∗
t . (2.39)
4. Relative prices satisfy
pct =
(
ω + (1− ω) (pt)1−η
) 1
1−η , (2.11)
pc∗t =
(
ω (pt)
1−η + (1− ω)) 11−η , (2.12)
qt =
pct
pc∗t
. (2.55)
5. Goods markets clear:
2∑
j=1
ωcjt
(
1
pct
)−η
+
2∑
j=1
(1− ω)c∗jt
(
1
pc∗t
)−η
= y¯1 + y¯2, (2.40)
2∑
j=1
ωc∗jt
(
pt
pc∗t
)−η
+
2∑
j=1
(1− ω)cjt
(
pt
pct
)−η
= y¯∗1 + y¯
∗
2. (2.41)
6. The market for all Arrow securities clears: for any future z,
ξt+1(z) + ξ
∗
t+1(z) + ξ
g
t+1(z) = 0. (2.42)
7. The dynamics of the exchange rate qt satisfies the belief function:
log qt+1 = Et [log qt+1] + zt+1. (2.43)
The budget constraint of the government (the law of motion for ξgt+1 as in
(2.24)) will be satisfied by Walras’ law. The bond holdings will be determined
recursively, and I omit them in further discussion.
The model admits a recursive representation. Since keeping track of the his-
tories makes simulations complicated, below I define the recursive rational expec-
tations equilibrium. The allocations that satisfy the conditions of the recursive
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equilibrium will also satisfy the conditions of the sequential equilibrium. Here I
will use the conventional notation by dropping the time t subscripts and marking
the next-period variables with a prime.
The state of the economy consists the exogenous state z and endogenous state
(Eq−1,Ω) where Eq−1 is past expectations about the current relative price p and
Ω is the relative wealth of the young evaluated in terms of marginal utility in
common units,
Ωt =
c−θ1t
c∗−θ1t
pc∗t
pct
. (2.44)
By the risk sharing condition (2.26), the current distribution of wealth Ωt will
impose a condition on the allocation of consumption in the next period: for any
future state,
Ωt =
β
β∗
c−θ2t+1
c∗−θ2t+1
pc∗t+1
pct+1
. (2.45)
Definition 3. A recursive stochastic equilibrium is a set of decision rules c1(z,Eq−1,Ω),
c2(z,Eq−1,Ω), c∗1(z,Eq−1,Ω) and c∗2(z,Eq−1,Ω), the pricing functions p(z,Eq−1,Ω),
q(z,Eq−1,Ω), pc(z,Eq−1,Ω) and pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω), and the laws of motion Ω′ =
G(z,Eq−1,Ω) and Eq = H(z,Eq−1,Ω) such that, given the law of motion of the
exogenous state
z′ = σε′
√
z + ϕ, ε′ ∼ N (0, 1), (2.46)
1. The decision rules for consumption solve the young’s utility maximization
problem:
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω)c1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
+ βEz′|z
[(
c2(z
′,Eq,Ω′)
c1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
)−θ
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc(z′,Eq,Ω′)
pc(z′,Eq,Ω′)c2(z′,Eq,Ω′)
]
= y¯1 + βEz′|z
[(
c2(z
′,Eq,Ω′)
c1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
)−θ
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc(z′,Eq,Ω′)
]
y¯2 (2.47)
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pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω)c∗1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
+ β∗Ez′|z
[(
c∗2(z
′,Eq,Ω′)
c∗1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
)−θ
pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc∗(z′,Eq,Ω′)
pc∗(z′,Eq,Ω′)c∗2(z′,Eq,Ω′)
]
= p(z,Eq−1,Ω)y¯∗1
+ β∗Ez′|z
[(
c∗2(z
′,Eq,Ω′)
c∗1(z,Eq−1,Ω)
)−θ
pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc∗(z′,Eq,Ω′)
p(z′,Eq,Ω′)
]
y¯∗2. (2.48)
2. The marginal utilities of the old satisfy
Ω =
β
β∗
c2(z,Eq−1,Ω)−θ
c∗2(z,Eq−1,Ω)−θ
pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω)
. (2.49)
3. The pricing functions satisfy
q(z,Eq−1,Ω) = Eq−1 + z, (2.50)
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω) =
(
ω + (1− ω)p(z,Eq−1,Ω)1−η
) 1
1−η , (2.51)
pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω) =
(
ωp(z,Eq−1,Ω)1−η + (1− ω)
) 1
1−η . (2.52)
4. The law of motion Ω′ = G(z,Eq−1,Ω) is given by
Ω′ =
c1(z,Eq−1,Ω)−θ
c∗1(z,Eq−1,Ω)−θ
pc∗(z,Eq−1,Ω)
pc(z,Eq−1,Ω)
. (2.53)
5. The law of motion Eq = H(z,Eq−1,Ω) is given by
Eq =
∫
z′
q(z′,Eq,Ω′)dF (z′|z). (2.54)
The following propositions characterize the static relationships in the model
and reduce the dimensionality of the model.
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Lemma 2. The real exchange rate qt depends solely on the relative price pt:
qt =
(
ωp1−ηt + (1− ω)
ω + (1− ω)p1−ηt
) 1
1−η
. (2.55)
Under home bias in consumption (i.e. ω > .50), the real exchange rate is increas-
ing in the relative price pt.
Lemma 2 states that there is a one-to-one mapping between the relative price
pt and the real exchange rate qt. It also establishes a positive link between the
relative price of endowments and the relative price of consumption. When the
domestic endowment is relatively expensive (low pt), the domestic currency will
also be relatively expensive. This conclusion comes from the assumption of the
home bias. When ω > .50, consumers put a bigger weight on the local good
in consumption. When the price of the local good increases, the price of the
consumption basket increases due to the appreciation of the bigger component in
it.
Next, define the total consumption in each country
ct = c1t + c2t, (2.56)
c∗t = c
∗
1t + c
∗
2t. (2.57)
Lemma 3. Under the goods market clearing conditions, the total quantities of
consumption depend only on the relative price pt. The corresponding consumption
functions ct = c(pt) and c
∗
t = c
∗(pt) are given by
c(pt) =
ω − (1− ω)pηt
2ω − 1 p
c(pt)
−η, (2.58)
c∗(pt) =
ωpηt − (1− ω)
2ω − 1 p
c∗(pt)−η. (2.59)
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In addition, under home bias in consumption (i.e. ω > .50), the home consump-
tion c(pt) is a decreasing function of the relative price and the foreign consumption
c∗(pt) is an increasing function in the relative price pt.
Lemma 3, together with Lemma 2, states that the international allocation of
consumption is uniquely determined by the relative price of consumption qt which,
in turn, is determined by the past beliefs Et−1 [log qt], and the shock to beliefs zt.
Fig. 2.4 illustrates how the international allocation of consumption is determined.
It plots the production possibilities frontier, the combination of all consumption
goods (ct, c
∗
t ) that can be produced given the total endowments in this two-country
economy. Its slope is negative due to resource constraints, and, under home bias,
the production possibility frontier is concave. At equilibrium, the marginal rate of
transformation (the slope of the production possibilities frontier must be equal to
the real exchange rate (the relative price of the two consumption). Point E is the
endowment allocation that can be optimally chosen under a certain exchange rate.
Suppose the realized exchange rate is relatively low. On Fig. 2.4, it is denoted
qlow. The domestic good is relatively more expensive than the foreign good. At
equilibrium, since the domestic good is owned by the domestic consumers, their
wealth increases, and the total consumption of the domestic good increases, and
the total consumption of the foreign good decreases. This allocation is indicated
as point A on Fig. 2.4. Similarly, the allocation B corresponds to the outcome
when the foreign total consumption is relatively bigger than the domestic total
consumption, and this allocation will be supported only if the exchange rate is
relatively big denoted qhigh, and the price of the foreign good is expensive. The real
interest rates, rt and r
∗
t , and expectations about the depreciation of the exchange
rate, Et [∆ log qt+1], will determine the intergenerational allocation of consumption
(c1t, c2t) and (c
∗
1t, c
∗
2t).
Lemma 4. The dynamical system (2.47) – (2.53) can be reduced to a two-dimensional
dynamical system in two variables: relative wealth Ωt and expectations about the
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Figure 2.4: The Production Possibilities Frontier and the Determination of Inter-
national Allocation of Consumption
future relative price Et [log qt+1], driven by the exogenous process zt.
Proof. The proof is trivial: eliminate all the static relations from the definition of
the recursive equilibrium.
As the following section shows, there are multiple dynamic equilibria; that is,
there are multiple decision rules and pricing functions, all of which are consistent
with the equilibrium conditions.
2.4 Multiplicity of Equilibria and Beliefs
This section establishes the fact that the dynamic system from section 3.6 exhibits
a multiplicity of dynamic equilibria near one of the two steady states. The belief
function (3.24) serves as an equilibrium selection mechanism.
2.4.1 Calibration
Because there is no closed-form solution, the model needs to be solved numerically.
I adopt the calibration presented in Table 2.3. This is an intentionally highly
stylized model, and the chosen values of the parameters are only illustrative.
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value
β Home subjective discount factor .80
β∗ Foreign subjective discount factor .75
θ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 3
η Elasticity of substitution across goods 1.50
ω Weight of domestic good in consumption .95
(y¯1, y¯2) Endowment profile in home country (.80,.20)
(y¯∗1, y¯
∗
2) Endowment profile in foreign country (.80,.20)
σ Scale factor in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process .50
ϕ Shift factor in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process 1
The subjective discount factors for home and foreign consumers are set equal
to .80 and .75 respectively. This implies that home consumers are more patient
than foreign consumers, and home consumers will accumulate wealth by selling
goods to foreign consumers. Because the young generations discount future utility
at different rates, they will hold different portfolios of assets. This will cause
significant international redistribution of wealth in response to the sunspot shocks.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion θ is set at a reasonable value of 3. This
degree of risk aversion will be sufficient for accumulation of precautionary savings
and will lead to a bigger redistribution of wealth across agents. The elasticity
of substitution and the home bias are chosen so as to make sure that aggregate
consumption responds little to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Section 5.4
discusses the link between aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate in
greater detail.
The endowment profiles (y¯1, y¯2) = (y¯
∗
1, y¯
∗
2) = (.80, .20) show that the young
generation has a significantly bigger endowment than the old. As discussed below,
this assumption is necessary to make sure that the indeterminate steady state
exists.
The parametrization of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is chosen so to as gen-
erate the slope of the Fama regression of −.25.
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2.4.2 Deterministic Steady States
The model developed in this paper is an extension of the canonical pure exchange
overlapping-generations model studied in the textbook by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004, Chapter 9). There are typically two deterministic steady states. To see
this, recall that for any generation j,
pctcjt = ajt + ptbjt,
and the same holds for the foreign economy. Write the present-value budget
constraints evaluated at the steady state and rearrange terms:
(a1 + pb1 − y¯1) +m (a2 + pb2 − y¯2) = 0 (2.60)
(a∗1 + pb
∗
1 − py¯∗1) +m (a∗2 + pb∗2 − py¯2) = 0. (2.61)
Add them up and use the goods market clearing conditions to obtain
(m− 1) [(a1 + a∗1 − y¯1) + p (b1 + b∗1 − y¯∗1)] = 0. (2.62)
The term in the second parentheses is the total young’s excess demand for goods.
The equation above shows that there are two steady states. The first steady state
is where m = 1 and there is intergenerational trade as the excess demand of the
young is not necessarily equal to zero. The second steady state is intergenerational
autarky, where the excess demand of the young is equal to zero: although there
is intra-generational trade, there is no trade across generations.
2.4.3 Multiplicity of Dynamic Equilibria
Theorem 1. Under the calibration from Table 2.3, the steady state with m =
1 is dynamically determinate and the steady state where m 6= 1 is dynamically
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Table 2.4: Decisions Rules and Dynamic Indeterminacy
Argument Determinate Indeterminate
of the decision rule steady state steady state
log Ω˜t−1 non-zero non-zero
Et−1 [log q˜t] zero non-zero
zt zero non-zero
indeterminate. In addition, around the indeterminate steady state there is a one
dimensional manifold of dynamic equilibria indexed by zt.
Proof. Consider a reduced dynamical system given by the equations from the
definition of the recursive equilibrium, without the belief function.
According to Lemma 4, the entire model can be reduced to a two-dimensional
system. The relative wealth Ωt is an endogenous state variable and the expected
exchange rate Et [log qt+1] is a jump variable. The state zt evolves exogenously
and may or may not affect the dynamics, depending on the dynamical properties
of the equilibrium.
According to the Stable Manifold Theorem (see, e.g. Perko, 2013), the stability
properties of a non-linear model are equivalent to those of the linearized model.
Therefore, postulate the linear solution of the form
log Ω˜t = g10 + g11 log Ω˜t−1 + g12Et−1 [log q˜t] + g13zt (2.63)
Et [log q˜t+1] = g20 + g21 log Ω˜t−1 + g22Et−1 [log q˜t] + g23zt (2.64)
where the variables with tilde represent deviations from a steady state and the
parameters gij are to be determined in equilibrium. Note that if a steady state is
determinate, past expectations must not matter and loading on the sunspot shock
zt must be zero. If a steady state is indeterminate, past expectations will matter
and loading on the sunspot shock will be distinct from zero. These conditions are
summarized in Table 2.4.
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I solve for the undetermined coefficients by log-linearizing the equations of
the model and matching the coefficients. To take into account the fact that the
conditional volatility of the future unknown variables may be of the first order in
magnitude, I use the following approach:
Et [Ωt+1] = ΩEt
[
exp(log Ω˜t+1)
]
= Ω exp
(
Et
[
log Ω˜t+1
]
+
g213
2
vart(zt+1)
)
where the second line holds due to conditional normality of zt+1 and where
vart(zt+1) is given by the assumptions of the model.
Solving for the decision rules at the two steady states produces the result of
the theorem.
2.5 The Model’s Implications
2.5.1 Impulse Response Functions for a Shock to Beliefs
Before demonstrating the main result of this paper on the forward premium
anomaly, I illustrate the mechanism of how the shocks to beliefs affect the equilib-
rium and propagate internationally. This subsection studies the impulse response
functions to the sunspot shock εt.
Fig. 2.5 displays the impulse response functions to a shock to beliefs about
the real exchange rate. The economy is initially at the steady state and in period
1, the real exchange rate appreciates by 1%. For all subsequent times, εt =
0. All variables are measured in percentage deviations from the deterministic
steady state.
The shock to the exchange rate is self-fulfilling: if agents believe that the
domestic good is becoming more expensive, the wealth of the young domestic
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Figure 2.5: Shock to the Exchange Rate: Impulse Response Functions
agents increases relative to the wealth of the foreign young agents. Due to home
bias in consumption, the domestic young agents increase demand for the domestic
good, and it, indeed, appreciates relatively to the foreign good. Subsequently, the
exchange rate depreciates and returns to the steady state.
Since the domestic agents become wealthier, they increase savings in the for-
eign economy. However, they understand the future exchange rate may change,
and they demand excess returns. This explains why the interest rate differen-
tial r∗t − rt becomes positive. Summing up the two effects, expected depreciation
and the positive interest rate differential take place, which explains the posi-
tive Fama slope.
Starting from period 2, there is no more uncertainty, and the expected excess
returns drop to zero. Since the exchange rate continues to depreciate, there is a
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Figure 2.6: Shock to the Exchange Rate: Impulse Response Functions (cont.)
negative interest rate differential that makes the returns on domestic and foreign
investments equal to each other.
Fig. 2.6 studies the adjustment of the economy in greater detail. Due to the
specification of uncertainty, a shock to the exchange rate leads to two effects:
immediate redistribution of wealth and increased volatility of consumption in the
future. Since the domestic young agents become wealthier, their consumption
exceeds consumption of the foreign young. At the same time, the risk averse
young agents respond to the increased risk by cutting consumption and making
precautionary savings. As a result, the level of consumption of the young in
both countries drops. As the young increase demand for bonds held by the old
generation, the resale price of the bonds rises, and consumption of the old increases
in both countries. Due to the redistribution of wealth, total consumption shifts
towards the domestic economy (see Lemma 3).
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Table 2.5: Simulated Moments and the Data
Moment Data Model
Canada France Germany Japan U.K. G6
std(∆ log qt) 1.97 3.19 3.27 3.44 3.12 2.57 1.14
std(r∗t − rt)/std(∆ log qt) .06 .07 .05 .06 .06 .06 .33
std(Etρt+1)/std(∆ log qt) 3.99 3.55 5.22 4.41 4.31 4.32 1.23
AR(qt) .98 .98 .98 .98 .97 .98 .34
AR(∆ log qt) −.06 .04 .04 .07 .09 .06 −.23
AR(rr∗t − rrt) .54 .60 .75 .58 .60 .78 −.43
AR(Etρt+1) .23 .62 .57 .86 .83 .73 .07
Fama slope β −.26 −.33 −.59 −1.23 −.84 −.89 −.25
Note: std = standard deviation, AR = first-order autocorrelation. The Fama slope β is as in
Table 2.2, column (A).
Starting from period 2, it becomes apparent that there is no more uncertainty
about the real exchange rate, and the need in precautionary savings disappears.
Consumption of the young rises, and consumption of the old falls. According
to the Euler equation, higher current consumption and lower future expected
consumption is supported by smaller interest rates.
2.5.2 The Stochastic Properties of the Model
The stochastic properties of the model qualitatively match those found in the
data. Table 2.5 compares the second moments generated by the model and in
the data. First, the exchange rate is a volatile process: the standard deviation
of the exchange rate is bigger than that of the interest rate differential. Second,
excess returns are even more volatile than the exchange rate. Third, the model
generates a persistent exchange rate, as in the data, and the mechanism relies
only on an endogenous propagation mechanism. Finally, the model reproduces a
negative Fama slope.
78
2.5.3 Reversal
Consider the general case again as in (2.9). Given the recursive structure of the
model, the interest rate differential depends on Ωt−1, Et−1 [log qt], and zt and its
lags up to order p. From the equation for the risk premium (2.31) it follows that
the risk premium depends only on the conditional variance of the future state,
vart(zt+1) which is given by (2.9). The future risk premia, Et [ρt+j], j > 1, will be
exactly equal to zero for j > p and will depend on the coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λp
for j ≤ p. Therefore, the Fama slope in the regressions of Et [ρt+j] on (r∗t −rt) will
depend on the parameters λ1, λ2, . . .. In a more realistic model, these parameters
could be estimated. Fig. 2.7 shows the reversal in β˜j as in (2.6) generated by the
model when λ1 = −.15 and all subsequent coefficients are set equal to zero.
The reversal in the Fama slope arises due to the reversal in the conditional
volatility of the shocks to beliefs. From Fig. 2.6 it follows that, in period 1,
a shock to the exchange rate occurs, and wealth is shifted towards one of the
countries. At the same time, as the conditional volatility of the exchange rate
increases, investors demand a risk premium. The Fama slope at a horizon of 1 is
positive. In period 2 the interest differential reverses as wealth tends to equalize
and capital flows change the direction. In a stochastic equilibrium, to generate the
reversal in the Fama slope, the reversal in the risk premium must be predictable.
Under the assumption λ1 < 0, in period 1 investors expect the interest differential
to reverse in period 2 and, as a results, they expect the risk premium to change
the sign. If λ1 = 0, there would be no correlation between period 1 and period 2
risk premia, and the expected period 2 risk premium would be equal to zero.
2.5.4 The Backus-Smith Puzzle
Backus and Smith (1993) document a weakly negative correlation between rela-
tive consumption (ratio of domestic aggregate consumption to foreign aggregate
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Figure 2.7: The Reversal of the Fama Slope in the Model
consumption) and the real exchange rate. This is a puzzle because in any model
with a representative agent and complete markets, the risk sharing condition im-
plies a strictly positive correlation: the domestic goods must be relatively cheap
to support relatively high domestic consumption (Chari et al., 2002).
In my model, the exchange rate is demand-determined. When domestic con-
sumption is high, due to home bias in consumption, demand for domestic goods
will also be relatively high. Domestic goods will be expensive relative to foreign
goods, and the exchange rate will be relatively low. Note that a low exchange
rate supports redistribution of wealth towards the domestic consumers because
the domestic consumers hold the endowment of the domestic goods.
The explanation of the Backus-Smith puzzle in my model holds under the
assumption of complete financial markets. Corsetti et al. (2008) and Itskhoki and
Mukhin (2017) are examples of the models that rely on market incompleteness.
To see the mechanism of this model clearly, log-linearize the two consumption
functions (2.58) and (2.59) and the real exchange rate (2.55) around a symmetric
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Figure 2.8: Parameter Space where std(c˜t − c˜∗t ) < std(q˜t)
point c = c∗ = 1 and q = 1 to obtain
log ct = −ηω(1− ω)
(2ω − 1)2 log qt, (2.65)
log c∗t =
ηω(1− ω)
(2ω − 1)2 log qt. (2.66)
It follows immediately that
log ct − log c∗t = −
2η(1− ω)
(2ω − 1)2 log qt. (2.67)
Provided η > 0 and ω < 1, relative consumption (log ct − log c∗t ) is negatively
correlated with log qt. In a model driven only by one shock, this correlation is
equal to −1 exactly. Addition of other shocks may reduce this correlation.
Equation (2.67) also gives insight on the volatilities of relative consumption
and of the real exchange rate. Relative consumption will be less volatile than the
real exchange rate if the coefficient on log qt in (2.67) is smaller than 1. This is
true if the home bias ω is sufficiently large (provided ω > .50) and if the elasticity
of substitution η is sufficiently low. Figure 2.8 shows the areas in the parameter
space (ω, η) where relative consumption is less volatile than the real exchange rate.
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2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
The empirical evidence on exchange rates and interest rate differentials produces
a long-standing puzzle: the forward premium anomaly (violation of uncovered
interest parity). Standard international macro theory predicts that the domestic
currency must tend to depreciate when the domestic interest rate is greater than
the foreign interest rate. The opposite is found for advanced economies in the
data. In addition, the data exhibits that positive interest differentials predict
future negative excess returns on the carry trade. Uncovered interest parity states
that there shouldn’t be any strong correlation between interest differentials and
excess returns.
This paper builds a model of the risk premium paid the on carry trade. In the
model, the exchange rate is determined by self-fulfilling beliefs. Shocks to beliefs
generate uncertainty and therefore risk premia. Changes in the real exchange rate
move wealth across countries and affect real interest rates, consumption alloca-
tion, and savings decisions. When investors believe that the domestic currency
will appreciate, given everything else equal, they prefer to borrow at a foreign
interest rate and purchase assets denominated in the domestic currency because
the expected appreciation adds to the profit from carry trade. However, investors
realize that the future exchange rate is uncertain, and they demand a risk pre-
mium. This makes the domestic interest rate greater than the foreign interest
rate. If agents believe that periods with high uncertainty precede periods of low
uncertainty, they will expect negative excess returns in the future. This reversal
in volatility explains the sign reversal of expected returns over longer horizons
found in the data.
Two assumptions are crucial for the results of the model: incomplete participa-
tion and the time-varying volatility of shocks to beliefs. Incomplete participation
in the form of overlapping generations produces an indeterminate dynamic equi-
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librium. The indeterminacy is resolved by introduction of a belief function. The
time-varying uncertainty makes agents demand a risk premium that is correlated
with the fundamentals of the economy.
Several points deserve discussion and clarification.
Why does the explanation of the data on exchange rates and interest rates need
to rely on multiple equilibria? First, although the belief function could have been
treated as a behavioral object, this could have introduced “irrational” behavior
into the model. The assumption of multiple equilibria brings market psychology to
the model without violating the rational expectations assumption. The formation
of beliefs, subject to shocks, bridges the rational expectations macroeconomics
with the literature on behavioral patterns found in investors and other market
participants.
Second, Beyer and Farmer (2007a) show observational equivalence of determi-
nate and indeterminate linear models. Consider two models: a determinate model
driven by shocks to fundamentals, and an indeterminate model driven by sunspots.
Without identifying assumptions, there is nothing in the data that could tell the
two models apart. The belief function is itself a fundamental object. Once one
takes this position, the equilibrium becomes determinate and the shocks to beliefs
are themselves fundamental. From this viewpoint, sunspot generated dynamics
are equivalent to the dynamics generated by a combination of the fundamental
shocks in a more complex model.
Third, because there are multiple equilibria, there may be other equilibria
that exhibit a different link between interest rates and exchange rates. Under a
different belief function, the predictions of the model would be different. There
are many belief functions that are not equivalent to each other. Following Farmer
(1999), here I take the belief function as a primitive and give it the status that
standard models attribute to preferences, endowments and technology. Beliefs can
be studied and estimated in the same way as any other primitives of the model,
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and the correct belief function becomes an empirical question.
Fourth, there are two steady state equilibria in the model. The dynamics is
analyzed around the indeterminate steady state. The indeterminate steady state
is dynamically inefficient. The other, determinate, steady state Pareto dominates
the indeterminate steady state. A reasonable question would be: Why is the
inferior equilibrium considered in the model? None of the results crucially depend
on the dynamic inefficiency of the steady state. Such a modeling framework was
chosen to demonstrate the mechanism of how beliefs can explain the observed
co-movements of foreign excess returns and interest rates. The results can be
extended to more complicated environments where the steady state is dynamically
efficient and indeterminate (e.g. a three-period overlapping generations model as
in Kehoe and Levine, 1983).
Fifth, the model assumes the existence of government “bubbly” bonds (sim-
ilarly to Martin and Ventura, 2012) and no other saving technologies. Indeed,
in the present model introduction of any other saving technology, such as social
security or physical capital accumulation, is likely to eliminate the indeterminate
equilibrium. Storage would preserve the indeterminacy of the steady state pro-
vided the return to storage is smaller than the interest rate at the efficient steady
state. Storage would simply put a lower bound on the equilibrium interest rates.
Kehoe and Levine (1983) is an example of a model in which no other savings
technologies are likely to be used in equilibrium. Explicit addition of a nominal
asset would preserve the multiplicity of equilibria.
Finally, newborns play a crucial role. Once more periods of life are added, the
share of newborns becomes smaller. When preferences are described by expected
utility, it will be harder to obtain a large and volatile risk premium in a multiple
period model, retaining the assumption of deterministic (not necessarily constant)
total endowment. However, preliminary results show that the introduction of
Epstein-Zin preferences to an overlapping generations model ensures that even a
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small fraction of newborns in the total population is sufficient to cause significant
redistribution of wealth across the existing agents.
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CHAPTER 3
Confidence Crashes and Stagnation
in the Eurozone
3.1 Introduction
Real economic activity in the eurozone has been stagnating since 2010 when the
eurozone was hit by a debt crisis. The stagnation in the eurozone differs from
typical business cycle fluctuations. It demonstrates unemployment persisting at
high rates and no recovery in real GDP. Economic models that rely on price
stickiness and on the existence of the unique long-run unemployment rate fail
to predict crashes like the 2010 eurozone crisis and absence of fast recovery in
real economic activity. I propose an original way of thinking about the Eurozone
crisis and the recession it caused in a general equilibrium model with rational
expectations.
I combine a model of a two-country monetary union with general equilibrium,
labor market search and matching frictions, and asset pricing in a new way. By
allowing for multiple equilibria on the labor market, I argue that beliefs about the
prices of assets play a crucial role in the determination of the unemployment rate,
real economic activity and international trade. With multiple equilibria, beliefs
about asset prices become self-fulfilling. Sudden downward revisions of the be-
liefs, so called ‘animal spirits’, can trigger persistent economic recessions. In such
economies, there may be no self-correction until beliefs recover. To put discipline
on how equilibrium is selected, we propose the belief function, a forecasting rule,
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as a new fundamental.
This paper contributes to the bigger subject of financial crises and economic
recessions. First, the model is a formalization of the crisis narrative that views
the eurozone crisis as a self-fulfilling crisis triggered by a loss of confidence in
the value of assets held by the peripheral countries of the eurozone. The periph-
eral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) relied on international
borrowing and accumulated large debts. In 2010, investors revised their beliefs
about solvency of these countries. The stock market crashes spread to the core
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In
our model, the financial crisis is caused by self-fulfilling beliefs about the value
of assets. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2016), Benhabib et al. (2016), Perri and
Quadrini (2014), Martin and Rey (2006) use a similar approach.
Second, I contribute to the large literature on causes and mechanisms of the
Great Recession, sometimes referred to as secular stagnation (Caballero et al.,
2008; Eggertsson et al., 2016; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2017 among many oth-
ers). The standard explanation for the slow recovery of the world economy after
the 2008 International Financial Crisis is the liquidity trap. Our explanation does
not rely on the zero lower bound. Instead, we view the multiple equilibria on the
labor market as a vehicle to capture persistence of high unemployment and the
absence of automatic recovery. Third, we connect the asset prices and real econ-
omy in a` la Lucas tree model, where investors’ ‘animal spirits’ cause stock market
crashes and economic recessions (Farmer 2012b, 2013). The model in this paper
displays contagion, when asset price crashes transmit internationally (Benhabib
et al., 2016; Van Wincoop, 2013; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Moser, 2003).
The approach of this paper builds heavily on Farmer (2010b, 2012b, 2013
and Farmer and Platonov (2019). It differs from the standard New Keynesian
paradigm in two ways. First, our model exhibits steady state indeterminacy. Due
to search and matching frictions on the labor market, the labor market equilib-
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rium is indeterminate. I assume away Nash bargaining over wage and let the
unemployment rate be determined by the aggregate demand. In our view, the
secular stagnation is not a deviation from the unique steady state; this is a new
steady state. Second, each steady state exhibits dynamic indeterminacy. There
are many dynamic paths that lead to the same steady state. To select a particular
dynamic equilibrium, we assume that prices are set one period in advance. Price
stickiness is an equilibrium feature of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section 3.3
discusses the steady state equilibria. Section 3.4 discusses the dynamic equilibria
and shows how a shock to confidence propagates over time and internationally.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Structure
The analysis of the Eurozone crisis is built on the interaction between two ex-
ante identical countries (regions), Home and Foreign. The conuntries are in a
monetary union, they share the same currency and have access to the common
loanable funds market. Each country can issue or buy bonds on this market. The
countries are ex-ante identical. The foreign variables are marked with an asterisk.
Time t is discrete and never ends. Each country is populated by a unit con-
tinuum of overlapping generations as in the Blanchard (1985) ‘perpetual youth’
model. Every consumer has an infinite horizon but faces an age-invariant proba-
bility of death. At the beginning of each period, a new cohort of consumers is born
to keep the population constant. As in Blanchard (1985), there exists a perfect
annuitites market. Through this market, wealth of those who did not survive into
the next period is redistributed to the existing consumers. The financial markets
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are sequentially complete. Consumers derive utility from a final nontradable con-
sumption good, assembled from the local and imported intermediate goods, and
from real money holdings.
In each country, there is a unit of non-reproducible physical capital. Physical
capital plays two roles. First, combined with labor, capital produces a country-
specific tradable good. Second, being a physical asset, capital has a market value
interpreted as the value of the stock market. Labor is immobile across countries.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, as in
Farmer (2012b). Firms need to withdraw labor from production and devote re-
sources to recruiting activities. Similar to the tragedy of commons, search has
negative externality on other firms. Generally, there is a positive equilibrium rate
of unemployment, with a unique socially optimal level of unemployment.1
Search and matching frictions on the labor market lead to multiplicity of equi-
libria. Instead of allowing for bargaining over wage with constant weights as a
selecting mechanism, I add a new fundamental: the belief function, as in Farmer
(2013). The belief function is a rule used by economic agents to coordinate on the
value of capital. The belief function does not contradict the rational expectations
hypothesis because, in a model with multiple equilibria, beliefs are self-fulfilling:
any level of confidence can be supported in a rational-expectations equilibrium.
The belief function picks a particular equilibrium out of many. When consumers
believe they are rich, they demand more goods (both local and imported). Firms
hire more labor to satisfy the demand. National wealth rises, and beliefs fulfill
themselves. Exogenous changes in the beliefs about the value of capital (‘ani-
mal spirits’) generate volatility and lead to crashes of the stock market and eco-
nomic recessions.
1Stabilizing macro policy should be aimed at maintaining the unemployment rate at the
socially optimal rate. Fiscal interventions and characterization of the optimal policy are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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3.2.2 Demand Side
Consumers face a constant probability of surviving into next period λ, and with
probability 1− λ they die. Let s = 0, 1, 2, . . . index the date of birth of an agent.
Consumers discount the future at rate 0 < β < 1 and maximize
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βλ)τ
[
(1− δ) log cst+τ + δ log
M st+τ+1
Pt
]
, (3.1)
where Cst is the consumption basket of a consumer born at time s, a combination
of domestic and foreign goods:
cst =
(
ω
1
ν (csH,t)
ν−1
ν + (1− ω) 1ν (csF,t)
ν−1
ν
) ν
ν−1
, (3.2)
and M st+1/Pt are real money balances held by the consumer.
The money price of the domestic good is PH,t and the price of the foreign good
is PF,t. Expenditure minimization implies the following demand functions and the
domestic consumer price index Pt:
csH,t = ω
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ν
cst , (3.3)
csF,t = (1− ω)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−ν
cst , (3.4)
Pt =
(
ωP 1−νH,t + (1− ω)P 1−νF,t
) 1
1−ν . (3.5)
Each consumer has one unit of labor inelastically supplied on the domestic
labor market. Due to existence of search and mathcing frictions, a consumer may
be employed or unemployed. Under the assumption that there is perfect insurance
within each generation, the intertemporal budget constraint can be written in real
terms as
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λ
(
Stk
s
t+1 + Et
[
Qt+1PH,t+1a
s
t+1
]
+M st+1
)
+ Ptc
s
t
= PH,tat + (St +Dt) k
s
t +
Wt
Pt
Lst +
M st
Pt
. (3.6)
Here St is the money market price of capital, k
s
t is ownership in the represen-
tative firm that pays nominal dividends Dt, a
s
t+1 represents purchases of Arrow
securitites denomenated in the units of the domestic good, and the price of the
Arrow securitites is Qt+1; WtL
s
t is nominal labor income.
Completeness of financial markets requires that the following no-arbitrage con-
ditions hold:
Et
[
Qt+1
(St+1 +Dt+1)/PH,t+1
St/PH,t
]
= 1. (3.7)
According to this condition, up to the first order approximation, the rate of return
on the stock market must be equal to the expected real interest rate (defined as
1/Qt+1).
Because the preferences are logarithmic, the spending on consumption and
money holding constitute a constant fraction of consumer’s wealth:
Ptc
s
t = (1− δ)(1− βλ) [(St +Dt)kst + Ptast + Pthst +M st ] (3.8)
λit
1 + it
M st+1 = δ(1− βλ) [(St +Dt)kst + Ptast + Pthst +M st ] , (3.9)
where it is the nominal interest rate that represents the opportunity cost of holding
money, and hst is real human wealth that follows the law of motion
hst =
Wt
Pt
Lst + λEt
[
Qt+1h
s
t+1
]
. (3.10)
Let aggregate variables denote the aggregated lower-case variables. The aggre-
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gate demand of the economy is completely described by the following equations:
ct = (1− δ)(1− βλ)
[
St
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
+ At +Ht +
Mt
Pt
]
, (3.11)
λit
1 + it
Mt+1
Pt
= δ(1− βλ)
[
St
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
+ At +Ht +
Mt
Pt
]
, (3.12)
Ht =
Wt
Pt
Lt + λEt [Qt+1Ht+1] , (3.13)
where the total amound of capital, Kt is set equal to 1.
Finally, because consumers can trade the Arrow securitites internationally, the
risk sharing condition holds for any two subsequent periods t and t + 1 and for
any realized states:
(
λCt
λCt+1 − (1− λ)(1− βλ)Ht+1
)−θ
Pt+1
Pt
=
(
λC∗t
λC∗t+1 − (1− λ)(1− βλ)H∗t+1
)−θ P ∗t+1
P ∗t
. (3.14)
The risk sharing condition states that the stochastic discount factors must be
equalized across the two countries.2
3.2.3 Supply Side
The supply side is comprised of a representative firm. The firm is owned by the
domestic households. It hires labor to produce goods, payes a fraction of revenue
in wages and the rest in dividends.
There are search and matching friction, as in Farmer (2012b). The firm uses
2For the derivation of the stochastic discount factor in a perpetual youth model, see Farmer
et al. (2011).
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capital K and hires labor Lt, and it faces the production technology
Yt =
(
α
1
νK
ν−1
ν
t + (1− α)
1
νL
ν−1
ν
pt
)
(3.15)
where Lpt is the amount of labor engaged in production.
3
The firm does not use all hired labor in production because search is costly; the
firm must devote labor to hire workers. If there are Lrt recruiters, the following
equations hold:
Lt = Lpt + Lrt, (3.16)
Lt = qtLrt. (3.17)
The endogenous variable qt is a measure of labor market tightness. It shows how
many workers one recruiter can hire. This variable is taken as given by firms.
The optimization problem of the firm is static: it maximizes dividends,
Dt = PH,tYt −WtLt, (3.18)
by choosing how much labor to hire Lt and how to allocate this labor. The first
order condition delivers,
WtLt = PH,t
(
Yt − α 1ν Y
1
ν
t
)
, (3.19)
Dt = α
1
νPH,tY
1
ν
t . (3.20)
At the macro level, there exists a matching function,
Lt = m(Lrt), (3.21)
3I depart from the Cobb-Douglas production function to avoid the problem of the ‘peculiar
financial equilibria,’ in which stock markets turn out to be perfectly correlated across countries.
For discussion, see Cass and Pavlova (2004).
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where m′(·) > 0 and m′′(·) < 0. This function determines the equiliblrium labor
market tightness,
qt =
m(Lrt)
Lrt
. (3.22)
The described structure of the economy makes labor Lt and the labor allocation
Lpt and Lrt residual variables. The aggregate demand Yt uniquely determines
labor Lt, and the factor payments can be expressed solely in terms of the aggregate
demand, as shown above. Therefore, labor will be omitted in the subsequent
analysis of the model.
3.2.4 Monetary Policy
There exists a central bank that issues the single currency held in both countries.
The money supply is denoted M cbt+1. For the sake of simplicity, the sequence of
the money supply is considered exogenously constant.
Due to market completeness, the nominal interest rate—the rate of return on
nominal claims that are in zero net supply—must satisfy
1
1 + it
= Et
[
Qt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
. (3.23)
3.2.5 Beliefs
Economic agents form self-fulfilling expectations about the real value of the stock
market, St/Pt and S
∗
t /Pt respectively. As in Farmer and Nicolo` (2018), these
expectations imply that the stock markets are martingales: the expectations are
adaptive:45
Et
[
St+1
Pt+1
]
=
St
Pt
exp (εt), (3.24)
4For an extensive discussion of belief functions, see Farmer (2016a).
5The martingale process is a special case of adaptive expectations, Et [St+1/Pt+1] =
(St/Pt)
ρ
(Et−1 [St/Pt])1−ρ exp (εt) for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. In this case, the expectations depend on
the current realization of the stock market and the past expectations.
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Et
[
S∗t+1
P ∗t+1
]
=
S∗t
P ∗t
exp (ε∗t ), (3.25)
where εt and ε
∗
t represent independent and serially uncorrelated shocks to expec-
tations, or confidence shocks.
Due to the presence of multiplicity of equiliria, the belief functions (3.24) and
(3.25) are rational, in spite of their adaptive nature.
3.2.6 Definition of the Equilibrium
A competitive rational-expectations equilibrium is a sequence of production quan-
tities {Yt, Y ∗t }, consumption {Ct, C∗t }, prices {PH,t, PF,t, Pt, P ∗t , St, S∗t }, human
wealth {Ht, H∗t }, realized contingent payments, prices of the Arrow securitites
and nominal interest rates {At+1, Qt+1, it} for all possible future states, and of
money holdings {Mt+1,M∗t+1} such that, given the exogenous confidence shocks
{εt, ε∗t} and monetary policy {M cbt+1}, the following conditions hold:
1. Consumers’ behavior is described by the demand functions (3.11), (3.12),
(3.13) and their equivalents for the second country
2. The goods markets clear:
ωCt
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
+ (1− ω)C∗t
(
PH,t
P ∗t
)−η
= Yt, (3.26)
ωC∗t
(
PF,t
P ∗t
)−η
+ (1− ω)Ct
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
= Y ∗t (3.27)
3. The nominal interest rate satisfies (3.23)
4. The money market clears:
Mt+1 +M
∗
t+1 = M
cb
t+1 (3.28)
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5. The no-arbitrage condition (3.7), its equivalent for the second country, and
the risk sharing condition (3.14) hold
6. The Arrow securities are in zero net supply:
PH,tAt + PF,tA
∗
t = 0 (3.29)
7. The stock market value satisfies the the belief functions (3.24) and (3.25)
8. Necessary transversality conditions hold
These equilibrium conditions are standard with one exception. The innovation
of the paper is the introduction of the belief functions that govern the value of
capital, and allowing for the shocks to beliefs about the future value of capital.
3.3 Steady State Equilibria
By giving up Nash bargaining over wage with constant bargaining powers, we
leave the labor market equilibrium indeterminate. However, once we introduce
the belief function and once we allow beliefs about asset prices to determine the
aggregate demand, the equilibrium becomes unique. Our model is isomorphic to
a model with Nash bargaining where the bargaining weights are dependent on the
aggregate demand.
The steady state in our model has two distinctive features. First, beliefs about
the value of assets are self-fulfilling. If economic agents believe prices of assets must
be high, the economy will be in equilibrium with high output and consumption,
low unemployment, and high values of capital. Second, any unemployment rate
can be sustained at the steady state. We call this property the steady-state
indeterminacy.6 For given beliefs, there is a unique unemployment rate. Since
6Farmer (2016a) discusses the evolution of the models with determinate and indeterminate
steady states.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Interpretation Value
α Coefficient on capital in the production function 0.33
β Time discount factor 0.99
λ Probability of surviving 0.99
δ Coefficient on money in utility 0.01
ω Home bias in consumption 0.95
η Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 0.50
ν Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 5.00
a range of beliefs can be sustained at the steady state, there is a continuum of
steady states indexed by the beliefs about the value of capital. An immediate
implication of the steady state indeterminacy is that there is no tendency for the
economy to self-correct in response to shocks.
Because of the complexity of the model, it is impossible to obtain the closed-
form solution for the steady state. We use the numerical solutions and demon-
strate the comparative statics graphically. We adopt the parameter values pro-
vided in Table 3.1 and plot the steady states on Fig. 3.1.
On Figure 3.1, each panel represents a three-dimensional diagram where the x-
axis and y-axis measure the exogenous beliefs about the real value of capital in the
steady state, S/P and S∗/P ∗ respectively, and the z-axis measures an endogenous
variable. The contour lines are depicted below each surface.
Panels (a) and (b) display output in each country. The total amount of goods
is increasing in beliefs about the stock market in both countries, but the effect
is asymmetric. When domestic consumers believe they are wealthy, they increase
consumption of both, domestic and imported, goods. Due to home bias in con-
sumption, the effect of the domestic stock market on the aggregate demand is
stronger than of the foreign stock market.
Panels (c) and (d), (e) and (f) show the positive effect of the two stock markets
on consumption and real money balances for each country. As the value of capital
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Figure 3.1: Steady-State Comparative Statics: the Role of Beliefs in the Deter-
mination of Equilibrium
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becomes larger in either country, the aggregate demand rises, and consumption
increases in both countries. Because consumers need money to purchase goods,
real money balances increase too. Again, home bias in consumption makes the
cross-country effects of the stock markets assymetric: domestic variables are more
sensitive to the domestic stock market rather than the foreign stock market.
Panel (g) shows the single nominal interest rate. Because there is zero inflation
at the steady state, the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate. The
interest rate is positively and symmetrically related to the stock market in each
country. The positive relation comes from the assumption that the money supply
is helod constant at the steady state. As the aggregate demand increases, the
demand for real balances increases, and the interest rate rises to clear the money
market. The symmetry is based on the assumption that there is a single loanable
funds market, and the interest rates must be equalized across countries.
Panel (h) shows the net foreign asset position of the Home country. For the
Foreign country, the net foreign asset position is equal to the negative of the Home
foreign asset position. As the domestic stock market rises, the Home country takes
a negative foreign asset position on the international financial market by issuing
bonds and selling them to the Foreign country. The domestic consumers need
currency to purchase consumption, and they trade bonds for currency. Because
there is a single currency market, the response of the foreign asset position is
symmetric to changes in domestic or foreign beliefs about the stock market.
Panels (i) and (j) display Home’s net export and terms of trade, respectively.
Domestic net export is positively related to the domestic stock market and neg-
atively to the foreign stock market. This comes from the fact that foreign debt
must be supported by future trade balance surpluces. As a result, there must be
depreciation of the terms of trade to promote positive trade balance. Since, at the
steady state, international trade is determined by the net foreign asset position,
both net exports and the terms of trade respond symmetrically to the domestic
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and foreign stock markets.
3.4 Dynamic Equilibria and Confidence Crashes
This section considers the dynamic equilibrium of our model. It describes how
the economy moves between the steady states in response to the shocks to expec-
tations. Because the object of interest in this section is deterministic convergence
to the steady state, the model is log-linearized around the socially optimal steady
state. The calibration from Table 3.1 is preserved.
The dynamic equilibrium is characterized by dynamic indeterminacy. To select
the unique dynamic path, the prices are assumed to be predetmined and set one
period in advance, based on rational expectations, as in Farmer (2000).
The belief functions (3.24) and (3.25) demonstrate that the expectations about
the future value of the stock market are weighted averages of the past expectations
and the current value. The adaptive nature of expectations allows to incorporate
the feedback response of expectations to the economy: not only expectations
determine the dynamics of the economy, but also the current equilibrium affects
the expectations.
To illustrate the dynamic properties of the model, this sectionstudies the im-
pact of a confidence shock εt. In period 0 the economy is at the steady state.
In period 1, beliefs at Home are hit by a negative 1% shock. The subsequent
dynamics of the economy is deterministic. Figure 3.2 shows the dynamic path of
the economy.
Panel (a) displays the dynamics of the expectations about the future stock
market, and panel (b) displays the realized value of the stock market. Although
the shock was as large as −1%, the decline in expectations is almost 2%. The
additional effect comes from the endogenous response of the current value of the
stock market, as depicted on panel (b). Pessimistic expectations about the future
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions: Response of the Economy to a 1% Crash
in Home’s Confidence.
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translate into an immediate crash of the stock market today due to the contagion
effect. Panels (a) and (b) shows that both stock markets crash in period 1, even
though there was a shock only to the Home economy. The stock market never
recovers, and the economy turns out to be in a new steady state.
Panels (c) and (d) display the dynamics of output and consumption. Since
the value of the stock market determines consumers’ wealth, the stock market
crash leads to a decrease in the aggregate demand and equilibrium output in
both countries. The effect on output lasts two periods. In period 1, prices are
predetermined and cannot adjust, causing contagion. In period 2, prices adjust,
and the recession deepens.
Panel (e) shows the real money balances. The real money balances depend on
the aggregate demand, and as the aggregate demand decreases, consumers reduce
the demand for money.
Panel (f) shows the dynamics of the nominal interest rate. In period 1, the
interest rate declines. Since there is no uncertainty after period 1, forward-looking
consumers correctly predict a decline in the domestic stock market, between peri-
ods 1 and 2. Due to the no-arbitrage condition, the nominal interest rate decreases.
In period 2, the interest rate rises above the initial steady-state level and remains
permanently higher that in period 0. The increase is caused by the implied dy-
namics of nominal prices: since the domestic goods are in smaller supply, they
become relatively more expensive.
Panel (g) shows the dynamics of the terms of trade for the Home country. The
terms of trade remain unchanged in period 1 due to the assumption that prices
are predetermined. In period 2, the terms of trade appreciate to clear the goods
markets, where the domestic goods are in smaller supply and appreciate relatively
to the supply of foreign goods.
Panel (h) shows the dynamics of current accounts. Because prices are fixed
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in period 1, the current accounts respond only in period 2. In period 2, the
Home country runs a positive current account; domestic consumers trade excess
currency for bonds, and the Home country experiences capital outflow. As the
terms of trade gradually return to the steady state value, the current account
declines to zero.
The dynamic experiment presented above illustrates the logic of prolonged
stagnation in the Eurozone based on a confidence crash. In 2010, investors became
pessimistic about the future of the Peripheral countries, and the stock markets
in Periphery crashed. Core’s asset prices responded to the shock to confidence
in Periphery. The channel for contagion is international trade. When agents
in Periphery become pessimistic about the value of their assets, production and
consumption in Periphery fall. For consumers in Core, Periphery’s goods become
relatively more expensive, so they reduce import. The wealth effect makes them
reduce consumption and hence production in Core. The decline of output in
Core is smaller than in Periphery for two reasons. First, there is substitution
effect: both economies switch to the Core goods against the goods produced in
Periphery. Second, the two countries share the same currency and prefer to hold
money proportional to consumption. As consumption falls in Periphery, Core
holds more currency than Periphery, which prevents big drops in Core’s output.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a two-country model of a monetary union to rationalize
the long-lasting stagnation in the Eurozone. By combining search and matching
frictions on the labor market, abandoning the Nash bargaining over wage, and
allowing for self-fulfilling beliefs about asset prices, I build a model that is con-
sistent with the stylized facts about the Eurozone crisis and stagnation. First,
the trigger of the crisis is a negative shock to confidence, to the beliefs about
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the value of assets in Periphery. Second, the model demonstrates financial conta-
gion. Pessimism about the value of assets in Periphery spreads over to the core
countries, causing an economic collapse all over the monetary union. Third, in
the model, confidence crashes have permanent effects: high unemployment and
low output can persist indefinitely long, without tendency to self-recover unless
confidence recovers.
The results rely on two distinctive features of the adopted approach. First, the
model displays steady state indeterminacy caused by multiple equilibria on the
labor market. This breaks the assumption that the unemployment rate returns
to its unique long-run optimal rate. Second, the model displays dynamic inde-
terminacy. The analysis is focused on a dynamic equilibrium with predetermined
prices. Price stickiness creates nominal persistence. Self-fulfilling beliefs propel
the shocks over time.
This paper develops as a rich environment for policy analysis. The model
suggests that managing the single nominal interest rate for the central bank is
not sufficient for recovery. While the interest rate affects relative production,
consumption and the unemployment rate, the level of production and of other
variables depends on the level of expectations about the stock market. A successful
policy should be able to address the level of the stock market, not only the rate
of return on capital. The future work will add fiscal policy to study the optimal
stabilizing, monetary and fiscal policies, and interaction between them, and the
role of labor mobility in a monetary union.
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